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  424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).  All the Justices except Justice Stevens, who did not1
take part in the decision, joined in the part of the opinion finding that there was a case or
controversy.  Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Powell joined the entire opinion, but the remaining
four justices joined in some parts and concurred or dissented in others.
  Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended in 1974, 88 Stat. 12632
(hereafter FECA).  The law was originally codified at 2 U.S.C. §§431 et seq., but Title 2 sections
were editorially reclassified as sections of Title 52, Voting and Elections in Supplement II of the
2012 edition. See The Office of Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives,
http://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/index.html).
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)3
for the proposition that “[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political
1
BUCKLEY 2.0: HOW WOULD THE BUCKLEY COURT DECIDE BUCKLEY TODAY? 
If you read Supreme Court campaign finance cases, you will be struck by the disconnect
between the lofty rhetoric used to justify the constitutional protections afforded political speech
and the impoverished sound bites and hyperbolic attack ads that dominate contemporary electoral
communications.  The origin of this disconnect is in large part two phenomena.  First, in the last
decade the Court has failed to take the factual record seriously and, as a result, makes
generalizations that are belied by contemporary campaign practices. Relatedly, the Court has
adopted doctrines that co-exist in uneasy relationships with campaign finance doctrines of
longstanding.  As a result, the Court has created an alternative universe that only first amendment
absolutists find credible, and it has constitutionalized an increasingly corrupt electoral landscape.
 All campaign finance cases rely, in varying degrees, on Buckley v. Valeo,  the first1
Supreme Court decision to evaluate the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), enacted in 1971.   Buckley spoke very forcefully about the importance of political speech2
for democratic self-government.  Yet the decision did not endorse an absolutist position for
protecting political speech.   Rather, the decision can be seen as striking a balance between the3
activities is absolute”).
  The main exception is McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), which invalidated4
FECA’s limit on aggregate contributions during a campaign cycle, despite Buckley’s upholding
that restriction.  See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.  Criticism of Buckley began with
the decision itself: five of the eight Justices wrote opinions that concurred in part and dissented in
part.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235. The most consistent critic of Buckley is Justice Thomas.  See
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 228 (urging that Buckley be overruled and listing five previous
decisions in which he called for it to be overruled). 
  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).5
2
free speech claims of individuals and groups with other societal interests, especially the integrity
of elections in a representative democracy.  Although that balance has been criticized by many, the
Supreme Court has so far declined to overrule the decision explicitly, preferring to cherry pick
among Buckley-originated doctrines.   As a result, the balance struck in Buckley between free4
speech values and the goal of election integrity has been lost, and it has been replaced by political
speech absolutism justified in pseudo-Buckley terms.
To draw out the consequences of these developments, I propose a thought experiment in
which I analyze how the Buckley Court would decide Buckley and recent cases today given the 
factual and doctrinal changes that have occurred since it issued its pioneering opinion.  I call this
thought experiment Buckley 2.0.  Part I examines campaign practices at the time Buckley was
decided and today and then compares the amounts spent then and now in constant dollars.  Part II
moves to the doctrinal plane and analyzes how Buckley 2.0 would likely respond today to issues
Buckley decided in 1976 or parallel issues arising today, taking into account contemporary
empirical data and campaign finance practices and doctrines developed in the last decade.
In Part III, Buckley 2.0 considers whether the time has come to overrule Citizens United
v. FEC.   It begins by reviewing the basic principles animating the original Buckley decision.  It5
3then examines the reasoning set forward in Citizens United in support of that Court’s conclusion
that Congress has no legitimate interest in restricting the sources of funds that corporations and
unions use to support candidates in federal elections if these organizations engage in independent
spending.  Based upon Buckley 2.0's analysis in Part II of the disparity between the concepts of
corruption, quid pro quo, the appearance of corruption, and independence as understood by the
original Buckley as against the interpretation set forth in Citizens United, Buckley 2.0 will
conclude that the later case did not faithfully represent the teachings of the original Buckley. 
Thus, it would reject Citizens United’s claim that its reasoning is based upon Buckley. Restoring
the original Buckley teachings and in light of empirical evidence derived from contemporary
campaign practices, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the original Buckley would find that
unlimited spending by corporations and unions pose a threat of corruption and the appearance of
corruption sufficient to justify Congress’s restrictions on the sources of funds for campaign
spending by those entities, even if they act independently of candidates. 
The immediate consequence of Buckley 2.0's conclusion would be to restore the provision
of federal campaign finance law requiring corporations and unions to use money raised by their
political action committees (PACs) to fund campaign messages that urge the support or defeat of
specific candidates for elective office.  As the statistics in Part I make clear, before the changes
initiated by Citizens United, spending by corporations and other business interests by means of
their own PACs and the PACs of trade associations to which they contribute had increased more
than fourfold over their spending at the time of Buckley, calculated in constant, i.e., inflation
adjusted dollars.  Invalidating the holding of Citizens United would thus leave those interests still
able to raise enormous sums of money to finance their campaign spending, although it would
  SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc),6
cert. denied 562 U.S. 1003 (2010).
4
require them to raise the money in according with federal rules governing the funding of PACs. 
Business interests would also continue to be able to avail themselves of the issue advocacy rules
to fund without limit most messages that omit express advocacy of the election or defeat of
specific candidates.  Thus, Buckley 2.0's rejection of Citizens United would leave business
interests able to communicate their views widely and effectively to the public using a combination
of regulated and unregulated funds.
   A more far-reaching consequence of Buckley 2.0's invalidation of Citizen United’s
independent expenditure ruling would be to invalidate the holding of SpeechNow.org v. FEC,6
which relied on reasoning of Citizens United to hold that individuals and groups can give
unlimited amounts of money to organizations engaged in independent spending, whether they are
Super PACs or independent expenditure exempt organizations, known as dark money groups. As
shown in Part I, the amounts raised in such vehicles since 2010 have been immense, profoundly
altering the financing of contemporary campaigns and deepening the lack of transparency of
campaign financing.  Thus, by rejecting Citizens United and thereby undermining SpeechNow.org,
Buckley 2.0 would roll back some of the worst excesses of contemporary campaign finance law
and practice.  Buckley 2.0 concludes further that even if Citizens United remains good law,
SpeechNow.org erred in affording contributions the higher level of constitutional protection
Buckley reserved for independent expenditures and in disregarding the heightened threat of
corruption posed by aggregations of unlimited contributions witnessed in recent elections.
Buckley 2.0 would thus find independent grounds for invalidating the holding of SpeechNow.org
  See IRS, Statistics of Income Tax Stats - Integrated Business Data,7
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-integrated-business-data (showing, based upon 2013
returns, that traditional “C” corporations account for 1.6 million of 33.4 million business returns). 
LLCs and other pass-through entities accounted for 3.4 million returns.  Id.
5
and restoring campaign finance law to a more faithful rendering of the original Buckley.
I.  THE ELECTORAL LANDSCAPE THEN AND NOW
Campaign finance law affects all who participate in the electoral process, whether as
individuals, business entities, or other groups.  This Part compares selected campaign practices at
the time Buckley was decided with the most recent presidential campaign cycle (2015-2016).  The
goal is to establish the electoral landscape–the facts on the ground–at the time of Buckley and
now, so that a hypothetical Buckley 2.0 will have an empirical basis for reassessing its original
decision in light of contemporary campaign finance law and practices.
There is a tendency to blame corporate spending for many of the ills of the campaign
finance system.  Those who do this probably mean spending by business entities or interests in
general, rather than corporations per se, given that much business revenue in the United States is
generated by non-corporate entities such as limited liability companies and other limited liability
business vehicles.   Business interests also contribute money or make expenditures through trade7
associations, chambers of commerce, and other interest groups.  The discussion that follows
attempts to be precise about which types of entities are at issue.  However, because what
corporations do or fund has traditionally been captured more systematically than campaign
spending by business interests in general, it is often not possible to compare apples to apples. 
This is especially true because the proliferation of types of business entities and outside groups
had not yet blossomed in the 1970s, when Buckley was litigated.  Moreover, the disclosure rules
 See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 84-78, POLITICAL ACTION8
COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION, GROWTH, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 55,
64 (1981, updated 1984) (hereafter CANTOR (1984)).
  See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 63-64 (describing the main private organizations9
and scholars that collected data before the FEC began to collect data systematically).  A
comprehensive empirical study of financing the presidential and Congressional elections in 1972 is
HERBERT E . ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION (1976) (hereafter ALEXANDER (1976)). 
In general, the present analysis examines presidential elections rather than off-year elections.  The
statistics compared include aggregate amounts spent on presidential and Congressional races
unless otherwise specified. 
  The case was heard by the Supreme Court in 1975; the decision was published January10
30, 1976.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
  See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND11
POLITICAL REFORM 16 (1976) (hereafter ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS).  According to
Alexander, the presidential contest cost $138 million in 1972, and the congressional contests
combined cost $98 million.  Id.  
  See http:/www.usinflationcalculator.com.  The inflation rate was 474.2%.12
  See Niv M. Sultan, OpenSecrets News, Election 2016: Trump’s free media helped keep13
cost down but fewer donors provided more of the cash, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2017/04/election-2016-trump-fewer-donors-provided-more-of
-the-cash.  Other sources list the total amount spent during the 2015-2016 election differently,
ranging from $6-7.5 billion.  See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. OF THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE
LANDSCAPE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3
(2017) (hereafter CED), https://www.ced.org/pdf/
TCB-CED-The-Landscape-of-Campaign-Contributions.pdf (listing total as $7.5 billion).
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enacted as part of the original FECA legislation did not become effective until April of 1972,  so8
data from the last presidential election cycle before Buckley is incomplete.  9
To provide perspective on the discussion that follows: The last presidential election held
prior to the Buckley litigation was in 1972.  The cost of the presidential and congressional races10
combined was $236 million,  or $1.378 billion in 2016 inflation-adjusted dollars.   In 2016, the11 12
cost of the presidential and congressional races combined was roughly $6.5 billion,  or roughly13
  The voting age population in 1972 was140,776,000. See The American Presidency14
Project, Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections 1820-2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
data/ turnout.php.  In 2016, it was 250,055,734, an increase of roughly 75%.  See United States
Election Project, 2016 General Election Turnout Rates, http://www.electproject.org/2016g.
  See Larry J. Sabato, Kyle Kondik, & Geoffrey Skelley, The Electoral College: The15
Only Thing that Matters, U.VA. CTR. FOR POLITICS (March 31, 2016),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/the-only-thing-that-matters.  See also William
A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the problem, in Nivola and David W. Brady, eds.,
RED AND BLUE NATION? VOLUME ONE 14 n. 29 (2006) (identifying roughly 24 competitive states
in the 1976 presidential election and 12 in 2004); Stacey Hunter Hecht & David Schultz,
Introduction, in STACEY HUNTER HECHT & DAVID SCHULTZ, PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY
ONLY TEN MATTER xi-xvi (2015) (recounting the history and concluding that the concept of a
swing state is not precisely defined).
  Between 1996 and 2016 the number of competitive districts decreased by over half to16
merely 17.  See Galen Druke, Want Competitive Elections? So Did Arizona.  Then the Screaming
Started, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 21, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
want-competitive-elections-so-did-arizona-then-the-screaming-started. According to another
source, in November 2016 there were roughly 395 safe seats in the House and of the 40
remaining seats, 11 seats leaned toward one of the parties.  See http://www.insideelections.com/
ratings/house/ 2016-house-ratings-november-3-2016.  In the Senate in 2016, 23 out of 34 in play
that year were considered safe.  See http://www.insideelections.com/ratings/senate/
2016-senate-ratings-november-3-2016.  The Cook Political Report has roughly the same
numbers.  See https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/139359;  https:/
/www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/senate-race-ratings/139360. 
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four and a half times as much as the 1972 federal elections in constant dollars.  Some of the
increase may be attributable to a larger electorate in 2016.   Yet there have been other14
developments that could have reduced the cost of races, such as many fewer swing states  and15
competitive congressional races,  as well as the use of relatively inexpensive electronic sources16
like e-mail and social media to reach potential voters. It is, then, not clear how much, if any, of
the 450% increase in this aspect of election spending can be attributed to the cost of reaching a
significantly larger electorate.  Other forces appear to be driving the rapid acceleration of the cost
of federal elections.
  Buckley examined the constitutionality of federal campaign law, so this essay is limited17
to federal issues, even though state campaign finance developments can affect federal practices. 
  On the many avenues for corporations to fund federal candidates or campaigns before18
FECA, see CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 28-35. For a history of the legal limits on corporate
campaigns spending, both state and federal, see United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S.
567, 570-87 (1957).  This history predates the enactment of FECA.  Id.  FECA considers
spending (by individuals or entities) that is coordinated with candidates or their campaigns to be
contributions to them and, therefore, subject to contribution limits.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46
n.53; 52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(7), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7); 11 CFR §109.21. 
  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81,19
codified at 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(2), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2).  BCRA amended FECA.  See
supra note 2.
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A.  Electoral Spending by Corporations and Other Business Interests
Business spending on federal elections has risen dramatically, assessed in constant dollars,
since 1976, when Buckley was decided.   Even in areas where corporations are still restrained by17
Buckley-era regulations, they now inject vastly larger sums into federal races.  In addition, when
Buckley was decided, corporations were limited in their electoral funding and spending by several
campaign finance laws that no longer apply.  The amounts spent by business interests in areas
affected by these changes have similarly risen dramatically.
1.  Spending by business interests where law has not changed.
From 1971 until 2002, corporations were allowed to spend their treasury funds (business
revenues) on most electoral matters except for expressly urging the election or defeat of specific
candidates (express advocacy) or for making contributions to candidates, their campaigns, and
their agents.   In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),  which18 19
included a provision prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds for “electioneering
  An “electioneering communication” is a communication made using broadcast, satellite,20
or cable media, if it is made in the 30 days before a primary or 60 days before an election, refers
to a candidate (by name or other identifying attribute or logo), and can be received by at least
50,000 people in a congressional candidates’s district, a senate candidate’s state, or, in the case of
a candidate for president, in the United States.  See 52 U.S.C. §30104(f)(3), formerly 2 U.S.C.
§434(f)(3); 11 C.F.R. §100.29(a), (b).
  52 U.S.C. §30118, formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a), 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (1976). FECA does21
not speak about PACs, but about “political committees,” which include PACs and other groups
involved in federal elections.
  52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(4)(A)(I), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (1976). 22
Corporations are permitted to solicit permitted parties twice a year, by mail, and at their homes
and as long as procedures are adopted to prevent the corporation from determining who had
contributed nothing or less than $50.  52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(4)(B), formerly 2 U.S.C.
§441b(b)(4)(B) (1976).  Early research found that most of the money raised came from high level
personnel.  See Mulkern, Handler, & Godtfredsen, Corporate PACs as Fundraisers, 23 CAL.
MANAGEMENT REV. 49 (1981).  Corporations are permitted to use their business revenues to pay
the expenses of administering their PACs.  See 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(2), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b.
  52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(1)(C), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C) (1976).  This statement23
was true of multicandidate PACs only.  If a PAC did not give to at least five different candidates
and raise money from 50 people, the maximum contribution to it was $1,000.  However, most
PAC s qualified for the larger contribution.  See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees, in
CORRADO, MANN, ORTIZ, POTTER, & SORAUF, EDS., CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM.  A
SOURCEBOOK 123, 124 (1997).    
9
communications” on the eve of a primary or an election.   Thus, as of 2010, corporations were20
required to fund contributions to candidates, express advocacy, and electioneering
communications through funds they raised in their political action committees (PACs), which are
strictly regulated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).   Among other restrictions, they21
can raise funds for their PACs from their shareholders, executives, or administrative personnel
(and the families of these groups), but not from the general public.   In addition, the amount each22
contributor can give to a corporation’s PAC is capped at $5,000.   Further, PACs are themselves23
limited to giving a maximum of $5,000 to each candidate, although they can also contribute
  See 52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(1), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(2)(A) (1976). 24
  See 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(4)(A)(ii), formerly 2 U.S.C. §§441b(a), 441b(b)(4)(A)(ii)25
(1976) (limiting unions to soliciting contributions from unions members and their families); 52
U.S.C. §30118(b)(4)(B), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(B) (1976) (permitting unions to solicit
members twice a year by mail at their homes as long as procedures are adopted to prevent them
from determining who has contributed nothing or less than $50).
  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  Although the26
plaintiff in Citizens United was a nonprofit corporation, the holding applies to all corporations and
to unions, as long as they operate independently of candidates and their campaigns. 
  See FEC, Campaign Guide: Corporations and Labor Organizations (Jan. 2018),27
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/colagui.pdf.
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additional amounts to certain political committees.   As a rule, these restrictions provided24
corporations with a smaller pool of funds and limited them to smaller contributions for the three
types of restricted activities than would have been possible in the absence of the FECA limits. 
Unions were similarly limited with respect to using their PAC funds for contributions and for
spending on express advocacy and electioneering communications.25
As discussed below, in 2010 Citizens United v. FEC held that corporations can use their
treasury funds on spending that is independent of candidates and campaigns.   This means that26
corporations can now use business revenues for express advocacy and electioneering
communications as long as they do not coordinate with candidates or campaigns when they
engage in these activities.  In contrast, corporations must still make contributions to candidates
for federal office or to their campaigns using money from their PACs.  Parallel rules apply to
unions.27
Although the same rules govern the funding of corporate PACs and contributions from
them to candidates today as they did when Buckley was decided, the sums corporate PACs and
 See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 124.  Another source has $3.1 million, but that28
figure combines “business” and “professional” contributions.  See ALEXANDER, FINANCING
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 214.  Professional PACs included PACs of groups like the American
Medical Association (A.M.A.), know as AMPAC.  Id. at 32-33, 60.  The 1984 Congressional
Research Service overview of federal campaign finance laws lists only contributions to
congressional candidates because presidential candidates then opted for public financing,
precluding contributions to them by PACs or others, and because PAC contributions to
presidential candidates have historically accounted for less than 5% of their contributions.  See
CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 65.  
  See https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_2016_24m.pdf.  29
Labor PAC contributions to all Federal candidates in 2015-2016 totaled $46,728, 402. Id. The
numbers reported on the FEC website are slightly different from those reported by the Campaign
Finance Institute, which applies its own methodology to the raw FEC statistics.  See, e.g.,
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t10.pdf.
  Prior to the enactment of FECA, which went into effect in April of 1972, corporations30
had no way to contribute to candidates.  See The Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34
Stat. 864 (1907).  Since FECA, they can contribute to them using PAC money.  
  The 1974 election was not a presidential election cycle, but the 1976 election also31
involved predominantly House and Senate contributions since the presidential candidates took
public financing.
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other business interests raised and contributed at the time the case was decided are very different
from what they raise and contribute today.  These amounts can be divided into contributions that
PACs make to candidates and other expenditures made by PACs.
In 1972 (the last presidential election before Buckley), corporate PACs gave at least $1.7
million to congressional candidates,  which would be almost $9,761,000 in 2016 dollars.  In the28
2016 election cycle, in contrast, corporate PACs alone gave approximately $182 million in
contributions to all federal candidates,  or more than 18 times the inflation-adjusted amount that29
corporate PACs contributed in 1972.  However, since FECA went into effect only seven months
before the 1972 election,  statistics from 1974 or 1976 might provide a better baseline for30
comparison.   In those two elections, corporate PAC contributions were $2.4 million and $6.731
  See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 124.  These amounts are somewhat exaggerated32
because they are based upon FEC data that combined “corporate” and “business” contributions. 
See id. at 124 n.2 (explaining the inconsistencies in FEC reporting of “business” and “corporate”
contributions).
  See Tie-ting Su, Alan Neustadtl, & Dan Clawson, Business and the Conservative Shift:33
Corporate PAC Contributions 1976-1986, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 20, 22, n.1 (1995) (stating that trade
association PAC contributions are “highly correlated with corporate donations”); CANTOR (1984),
supra note 8, at 88 (stating that trade associations and health care groups are assumed to have “a
basically pro-business orientation”).  
  See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 125, n.2.  Another source classifies business,34
professional, agricultural, dairy, and health-related groups as “special interest groups,” see
ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS, supra note 11, at 228, but does not distinguish business and
professional when it lists contributions, see id .at 214.  Alexander does list contributions by dairy,
education, health-related, and “rural-related” (which includes electrical and agricultural interests),
and contributions by these groups totaled $3,950,000 in 1972.  
  See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 125 and n.3.  See also JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG.35
RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 86-148, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: A GUIDE
TO THE LAW AND ITS OPERATION 36 (1986) (hereafter CANTOR (1986)) (listing $10 million in
“business-related” contributions to candidates, which included a portion of trade association
contributions).  But see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND
POLITICAL REFORM 84 (2d ed. 1980) (hereafter ALEXANDER (1980)) (stating that corporate and
business-related trade associations gave more than $7 million in direct contributions to candidates
that year).
12
million respectively,  or $11,680,000 and $28,260,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars. 32
Contributions by corporate entities in 2016 thus increased roughly 350% over the counterpart
contributions in the earlier years, in constant dollars.  
Trade associations also represent business interests.  The category was not identified as33
such in 1972 as it is now.   In 1974 and 1976, “Trade, Membership, and Health” group PACs34
contributed $1.8 million and $2.6 million to congressional candidates, respectively,  which are35
$8.76 million and $11 million in inflation-adjusted dollars.  In 2015-2016, trade associations
  See http://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_2016_24m.pdf.  In36
2015-2016, trade associations gave $213,407 to presidential campaigns.  Id.
  See http://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_2016_24m.pdf. 37
  A better comparison might be that in 1974, business and business related special38
interest groups gave $4.8 million to House and Senate candidates, see ALEXANDER, FINANCING
POLITICS, supra note 11, at 228, or $27.3 million in 2014 dollars, as compared with $257,264,309
in the 2014 House and Senate races.  See https://classic.fec.gov/press/summaries/2014/
tables/pac/PAC2_2014_24m.pdf.  Contributions in 2014 were more than 9 times the contributions
in 1974 in constant (2014) dollars.
  See infra Part I.A.2.39
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contributed $82,561,099 to congressional candidates,  an increase of 387% and 322% over 197436
and 1976.  In addition, membership and cooperative PACs in 2015-2016 contributed almost $45
million to congressional candidates.   These comparisons are rough, among other reasons,37
because health PACs are not broken out in 2015-2016 and because not all membership PACs are
business oriented, e.g., those of the Sierra C lub and the National Rifle Association.   Despite38
these limitations in the data, combining inflation-adjusted totals of corporate and trade association
PAC contributions in 1974 ($20 million) and 1976 ($40 million) with comparable amounts in
2016 ($265 million), business-related PACs in 2016 contributed to candidates between six and ten
times what they did in the period before Buckley was decided, even though the campaign finance
rules in this area have remained unchanged.
The dramatic increase in business-related contributions to candidates for federal office has
been mirrored by other expenditures made by business interests in federal elections (without
taking into account their contributions to Super PACs and social welfare organizations, which are
discussed below ).   Typical examples include independent expenditures, contributions to state or39
local candidates, direct mail, contributions to presidential candidates in primaries, fundraising, and
  See CANTOR (1984), supra note 8, at 68-70.  According to Cantor, independent40
expenditures were responsible for an increasing share of PAC spending other than contributions
to candidates between 1974 and 1980.  Id. at 67.
  See FEC Press Release, FEC Releases Index on Corporate-Related Political41
Committees (Sept. 18, 1977), https://transition.fec.gov/press/archive/1977/
19770918_Index-76PAC.pdf.  There is no separate data for corporate PAC expenditures in 1974;
for combined “business related” expenditures of $8.1 million in 1974, see CANTOR (1984), supra
note 8, at 84. Cantor notes that the numbers are “subject to dispute” because of a lack of
consistency in standards for types of business spending prior to 1978.  See id  at 83-84.
  See Federal Election Comm’n, (2017), Summary of Pac Activity,42
https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_2016_24m.pdf.  During the
1975-1976 election cycle, union PACs spent a total of $17.5 million on federal candidates,
Richard Briffault, Herbert E. Alexander & Elizabeth Drew, The Federal Election Campaign Act
and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2100 (1984), or $73,815,861 in 2016 dollars,
compared with total union PAC spending in the 2015-2016 election cycle of $256,851,404, see
id., which is roughly 3 ½ times the 1975-1976 amount in constant dollars.  
 See ALEXANDER (1980), supra note 35, at 84.43
  See https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_2016_24m.pdf.44
with FEC Press Release, Statistical Summary of 24Month Campaign Activity of the 2015-2016
Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-
24-month- campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle.  The former states that trade association
contributions in 2015-2016 to candidates for president, House and Senate totaled $82.7 million,
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administrative costs.   According to the FEC, corporate PACs had roughly $5.8 million in total40
expenditures in the 1975-1976 election cycle,  equal to $24,464,685 in 2016 dollars.  In the 201641
election, in contrast, corporate PACs spent $385,710,026 in total expenditures on behalf of
federal candidates,  which is more than 15 times what they spent in 1975-1976 in constant42
dollars.
In addition to direct spending by corporate PACs, business-related trade association PAC
expenditures for congressional candidates in the 1975-1976 election cycle was roughly $5.5
million,  which would be $23.2 million in 2016 dollars. Trade association PACs spent43
approximately $65.5 million in the 2015-2016 cycle,  or more than six times as much in constant44
while the latter states that total trade association PAC disbursements during that election were
$148.2 million.  This leaves $65.5 million for all other trade association PAC spending. 
  See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.45
  See supra note 26 and accompanying text.46
  See infra note 87.  Independent expenditures of any size made by individuals singly47
have been protected by the Supreme Court since Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51, so they were unaffected
15
dollars.  Given that trade association PAC expenditures combined with corporate PAC
expenditures were $456,210,026 in 2015-2016,  corporate and business related PACs spent45
almost ten times in 2015-2016 than they did in 1975-1976, in constant dollars.
In sum, combining business-related contributions to candidates with their other
expenditures, business interests spent $716 million in 2015-2016, as compared with $87 million in
1975-1976 (in inflation-adjusted dollars), or eight and a half times more than in the 1976 election
cycle.  This dramatic increase does not take into account increased spending by business interests
as a result of the 2010 decision in Citizens United.
2.  Business spending after changes in the law.
Changes in the Court’s election law doctrines have accelerated the increases in amounts
spent by corporations and other business interests on elections.  Since Citizens United held that
corporations can spend non-PAC money for independent expenditures in elections,  the amount46
of corporate expenditures during campaigns has increased, although it is difficult to track such
spending for two reasons.  First, corporations and other business entities are now free to
contribute unlimited amounts to independent expenditure-only groups.  Some of these
organizations are exempt from income tax under the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter IRC), are
active in political campaigns, and rarely have to disclose or fully disclose their donors.   For47
by the two judicial rulings.  Independent expenditure-only groups are funded with contributions
unlimited in amount from businesses, unions, or individuals as long as the groups operate
independently of candidates, parties, and their campaigns.  See infra note 93.
  See 11 CFR §104.20; 52 U.S.C. §30104(f).  Although FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,48
551 U.S. 449 (2007), narrowed the reach of the term “electioneering communication” for some
purposes, it did not disturb the existing broader definition for purposes of the disclosure rules. 
  See 11 CFR §109.10(b)-(e); 52 U.S.C. §30104(c).  See 11 CFR §104.20(c)(9). 49
  See Revenue Procedure 2018-38, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280.  This decision is being50
challenged in court.  See Bullock v. IRS, D. Mont., No. 4:08-cv-08000, filed July 24, 2018.  See
also Cong. Rec. S6380 (Sept. 28, 2018) (challenge by Sen. Ron Wyden to what he calls the
“Dark Money Rule” introduced by the IRS).  The IRS once mistakenly left donors’ names visible
when it made an organization’s Form 990 public.  See Paul Abowd, IRS ‘Outs’ Handful of
Donors yo Republican Group, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Apr. 4, 2013),
https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/irs-outs-handful-of-donors-to-republican-group. 
  See Press Release, Rep. Price Introduces Legislation to Overturn Controversial “Dark51
Money Rule” (Dec. 13, 2018), https://price.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
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example, exempt organizations, like section 501(c)(4) social welfare groups and section 50(c)(6)
trade or business association groups, until recently had to list their donors on their IRS
information returns, but this information was not disclosed to the public, although the FEC
disclosure rules imposed on organizations making “electioneering communications”  in the run-48
up to a primary or election or engaging in express advocacy might reveal donor identities in the
rare instances when the donations were earmarked for these purposes.   Thus, the identities of49
individual corporate or other business entity donors to such exempt organizations were usually
not disclosed to the public.  Moreover, the IRS changed its disclosure policy in 2018, so that
these exempt organizations no longer have to list their donors’ identities on the information
returns filed with the IRS.   The IRS’s new position has been widely criticized, among other50
reasons because it will no longer be able to determine if donors to the organizations are foreign
persons, who are prohibited by law from funding election activities.   The new policy will also51
rep-price-introduces-legislation-overturn-controversial-dark-money-rule.
  Under the rules of the IRS, exempt organizations must be “primarily” devoted to the52
purpose and activities that constitute the mission justifying their exemption from taxation, e.g.,
social welfare for section 501(c)(4) groups, employee welfare for section 501(c)(5) labor groups,
and business interests for 501(c)(6) trade associations and related groups.  See 26 C.F.R.
§1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(I); IRS, Gen. Couns. Mem. 34233 (Dec. 3, 1969).
  IRC §527(j)(3)(B).  The requirement applies to donations of $200 or more in a53
calendar year.  Id.
  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003) (basing its statement on the record in the54
case).
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prevent the IRS from determining total contributions to such entities by corporations, LLCs, and
other business entities or by labor unions and similar organizations.  Thus, even aggregate data
could not be made available to lawmakers or the public, denying the possibility of accurate
information about the magnitude of business interests funding such entities.
The exempt organizations may use these donations to fund their own election advertising
or other campaign activities. Alternatively they can transfer some or all of their money available
for campaign spending  to Super PACs, which are subject to disclosure rules.  In practice this52
means that Super PACs reveal the names of individuals and entities who give directly to them, but
the names of entities usually do not reveal the ultimate donors to their funds. As a consequence,
the extent of business spending on campaigns that is funneled through certain exempt organization
intermediaries cannot be known.  Similarly, although section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
requires PACs not regulated by FECA to disclose their donors,  the disclosures typically only53
reveal the immediate, not the ultimate donor.  In many instances, then, corporations may be
“hiding behind dubious and misleading names,”  so their political spending is invisible to the54
public and impossible to quantify. Further, groups have devised other stratagems for donors’
  For example, in the month before a recent special election in Alabama, at least one55
super PAC bought millions of dollars of ads on credit, thereby avoiding the need to disclose its
donors until after the election.  See Ashley Balcerzak, Mystery money floods Alabama in Senate
race’s final days, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.publicintegrity.org/
2017/12/08/21368/ mystery-money-floods-alabama-senate-races-final-days.  See also Dodging
Disclosure: How Super PACs Used Reporting Loopholes and Digital Disclaimer Gaps to Keep
Voters in the Dark in the 2018 Midterms, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Nov. 2018), https://
campaignlegal.org/sites/ default/ files/2018-11/
11-29-18%20Post-Election%20Report%20%281045%20am%29.pdf.
  See 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(6)-1 (stating that a section 501(c)(6) organization “is an56
association of persons having some common business interest,” that is devoted to advancing that
common business interest, although the organization cannot itself engage in a business for profit).  
  I.R.C. §162(a).57
  See I.R.C. §162(e); Treas. Reg. §1.162-20(c)58
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identities to evade disclosure.  55
In contrast, in the case of trade associations and chambers of commerce, which are exempt
under section 501(c)(6), all their money comes from business interests.   Thus, although the56
donors to these organizations are also not disclosed to the IRS, some of their spending on
campaigns can be captured.  In particular, business are usually permitted to deduct the cost of
dues to trade associations from their gross income, thereby reducing their taxable income.  57
However, the Code denies such deductions for costs incurred for campaigning or lobbying,
whether the money is spent directly by the business entity or through an intermediary, such as a
trade association that engages in these activities.   Because those seeking business deductions for58
dues or other payments made to trade associations have the burden of showing the portion of
their payments not attributable to campaigning or lobbying (by the organization), the Code
requires the organizations to tell donors the percent of their payments attributable to the
  See I.R.C. §6033(e).59
  See IRS Form 990, Schedule C.60
  See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, FED. ELECTION CTR., CFI’S GUIDE TO61
MONEY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 2016 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1 (2018) (hereafter MALBIN &
GLAVIN); CED, supra note 13, at 5, 6.
  Andrew Mayersohn, Four Years After Citizen United: The Fallout, OPENSECRETS.ORG62
(Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/
four-years-after-citizens-united-the-fallout.  On outside spending, see infra Part I.C. 
  See Trevor Potter, Citizens United Defenders Use Deceptive Arguments to63
Underestimate Money in Politics, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://campaignlegal.org/update/citizens-united-defenders-use-deceptive-arguments-
underestimate-money-politics (arguing, based upon data provided by OpenSecrets.org, that Floyd
Abrams’s claim that corporate spending since Citizens United represents a “comparatively small”
part of campaign spending during that period is “highly misleading”). Potter also notes that data
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nondeductible activities.   The aggregate amounts spent on each of these activities should also be59
listed on an organization’s information return,  making possible an estimate of the amount each60
trade association has spent each year on campaign related activities.
As a result of the complexities involved in tracing the sources of campaign spending by
independent expenditure entities, experts disagree about whether, or to what degree, corporate
and other business spending has increased since Citizens United was decided.  According to
several sources, large, publicly traded corporations have not increased their non-PAC political
spending.   However, privately held corporations electoral spending is not covered by this61
assertion, and according to one source, in 2012 privately held businesses that used treasury funds
on electoral spending “were among 2012's biggest sources of outside money.”   In addition, as62
noted earlier, business spending not subject to contribution limits may not be captured when an
intermediary vehicle, such as a section 527 organization, a super PAC, or an exempt organization
is utilized.   Data provided by The Campaign Legal Center, a watchdog group, reveal that trade63
based upon corporate contributions to candidates for president is misleading because 99 percent
of corporate PAC contributions in 2016 went to candidates for Congress.  Id.
  See Potter, supra note 63.64
  CED, supra note 13, at 5 (Figure 2).  The remaining 68% was contributed by65
individuals. See id.  CED’s statistics for Super PACs are based upon an analysis of the 90 largest
Super PACs, which were the source of 94% of Super PAC spending in 2015-2016.  Id. at 4. 
Since Super PACs are only required to report contributors who give $200 or more, the CED
analysis is based upon 81% of Super PAC receipts in 2015-2016. 
  Outside Spending in Elections, ISSUEONE.ORG, at66
https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/outside-spending.pdf.
  Id.67
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association groups spent more than $129 million on election advertising from 2012 to 2016, and
IRC §501(c)(4) groups spent more than $520 million on elections during the same period.  64
While it is probable that trade associations represent business interests, it is unclear what
proportion of spending by IRC §501(c)(4) groups reflects business interests because these groups
do not need to reveal the identities of their contributors and their missions may be attractive to an
array of interests, not all of which are business oriented.  
What is known is that overall, contributions to Super PACs in 2015-2016 by entities of all
kinds (such as unions, corporations, trade associations, PACs, and other super PACs) totaled
$519,000,161, or 32% of contributions to Super PACs in that election cycle. And that a third to a
half of that sum came from business interests.   Again, these are amounts disclosed and the65
immediate donors, whereas, as noted above, there are potentially large sums of undisclosed
spending and misleadingly disclosed contributors that cannot be identified or quantified.  Thus,
since Super PACs became the “primary vehicles of outside spending,”  and outside spending66
accounted for more than one-fifth of election spending in 2015-2016,  business interest spending67
  See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.  The statistics cited in this section68
include only reported expenditures.  See also infra Part I.D
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.69
  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 56270
U.S. 1003 (2010).
  On Super PACs, see R. Sam Garrett, Super PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and71
Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT R42042 (Sept. 16, 2016);
Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012).
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on elections has increased commensurately.  Given that business interests have also increased their
spending under pre-Citizens United law more than eight times,  it is fair to conclude that68
campaign spending by business interests today has increased dramatically over what it was at the
time of Buckley, even after correcting for inflation. 
B.  Individual Contributions and Spending
Since Buckley individuals singly have been able to spend unlimited amounts directly on
campaigns if they do not coordinate with a candidate or a candidate’s campaign.   In 2010, the69
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit greatly expanded individuals’ ability to
influence campaigns by enabling them to give unlimited amounts to groups, if the groups act
independently of candidates and their campaigns.   This decision, known as SpeechNow or70
SpeechNow.org, enabled individuals to amplify the impact of their spending by combining their
contributions with other contributions--large and small, made by other individuals or by
ideological or business groups--in one campaign vehicle acting in a unified way.  These
independent expenditure groups are now known as Super PACs.71
Even extremely large amounts spent by a wealthy individual singly can have their impact
amplified by being combined with contributions from other individuals and entities.  The 
  See FEC Press Release, Statistical summary of 24-month campaign activity of the72
2015-2016 election cycle (Mar. 23, 2017) (identifying $1.8 billion in disbursements from all
separate segregated fund PACs and all nonconnected PACs), www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-
summary-24month-campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycl. See also Nathaniel Persily, Robert
Bauer, and Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Campaign Finance in the United States: Assessing an Era of
Fundamental Change, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 38 (Jan. 2018) (explaining that Super PACs
raised $1.8 billion but only spent $1.1 billion in the 2016 election cycle).
  See CED, supra note 13, at 5 (Figure 2) (noting that individuals accounted for 67.7%73
of itemized contributions to Super PACs, or $1,086,032,803).  This is “roughly double the $538
million individuals gave to Super PACs in 2012.” David B. Magleby, Super PACs and 501(c)
Groups in the 2016 Election 7 (unpublished paper, Nov. 9-10, 2017), https://www.uakron.edu/
bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/magleby.pdf.  See also supra note 70 (noting the difference
between amounts contributed to Super PACS and their expenditures).
  MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 61, at 9.74
  This cap on individual contributions to regular PACs was established by the 197675
amendments to FECA, which were enacted in response to the Buckley decision.  See Federal
Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, §112, 90 Stat. 475, enacting 2
U.S.C. §441(a)(1)(C). 
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amplification effect will be heightened because none of the contributors to the recipient
organizations will be subject to dollar limits, so the resulting combined funds are in principle
unlimited.  In the 2015-2016 election cycle, Super PACs spent in excess of $1.1 billion, which
was almost half of the spending of all PACs active in the election cycle combined.   One estimate72
based upon data available from the FEC found that almost 68% of contributions to Super PACs,
or roughly $1.1 billion, came from individuals.   A large part of that amount came from73
contributions that would not have been legal before SpeechNow.org,  given that prior to that74
decision individuals could give at most $5,000 to a single PAC.   In the 2015-2016 cycle, of the75
$1.1 billion contributed by individuals to Super PACs, the top one percent of individual donors
(511 individuals) contributed $933,609,804 or 89% of all individual contributions, and the
remaining 50,500 individuals who gave to those Super PACs in aggregate contributed 11% of the
  See Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, Donor Stats (2016),76
OPENSECRETS.ORG,  https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=I.
  MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 61, at 9.77
  Sultan, OpenSecrets News, Election 2016, supra note 13 (noting that the increase in78
number of individuals in 2016 was only 3 percent).
  See Adam Lioz, Juhem Navarro-Rivera, and Sean McElwee, Court Cash: 201679
Election Money Resulting Directly From Supreme Court Rulings, DEMOS 2, 4, 7 and n.10 (Mar.
14, 2017), http://www.demos.org/publication/court-cash-2016-election-money-
resulting-directly-supreme-court-rulings.  
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total.   Again, records reveal that 85% of the money raised by the Super PAC associated with76
Hillary Clinton’s campaign came from donors who contributed at least $1 million dollars.  77
Taking into account other unlimited spending vehicles, such as IRC §501(c)(4) organizations,
OpenSecrets.org estimates that the top one percent of the top one percent (.01 percent) of
contributors to federal elections gave more than $2.3 billion in 2015-2016, which was 45 percent
more than the parallel group gave in 2012.    78
Thus, the changes initiated by Citizens United and extended by SpeechNow.org, which
enabled individuals to give unlimited amounts to independent expenditure entities, have resulted in
a dramatic increase in the overall amount contributed by individuals to such organizations.  One
analysis has estimated that more than $1 billion of total federal election spending in the 2015-2016
cycle is attributable to changes in the law made by Citizens United and SpeechNow.org.  79
Regardless of whether one finds these amounts troubling as a policy matter, they have created an
electoral environment unimaginable to the Buckley Court.  Equally dramatic, the changes
discussed have made it possible for a small number of extremely wealthy individuals to dominate
  Outside spending groups include Super PACs and exempt organizations such as section80
501(c)(4) social welfare groups, section 501(c)(5) union groups, and section 501(c)(6) trade
associations.  See infra note 87 and accompanying text.  Not all of these groups need to report all
of the funds they raise or spend.  See Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Outside Spending, What Super
Pacs, Non-Profits, and other Groups Spending Outside Money Must Disclose about the Source
and Use of their Funds, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/rules.php. 
  See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).81
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.  The limit had already increased to $123,200 by 2012.  See82
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 194.  See also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43334,
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS: SELECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT MCCUTCHEON AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2014).
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outside spending vehicles.   The potential dominance over specific races attributable to80
contributions from such a small number of donors may mark the greatest departure of the current
electoral landscape from electoral politics at the time of Buckley.
In addition to the impact of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, the potential for greatly
increased individual spending on behalf of traditional recipients of regulated contributions also
may have occurred because of a change in the law regarding aggregate spending, although it is
too soon to know what the actual effects of the change will be.  The legal change occurred when
the Court ruled in McCutcheon v. FEC that Buckley-era caps on aggregate per election cycle
spending per election cycle are unconstitutional.   At the time of the Buckley decision, the81
aggregate contribution limit on individuals imposed by FECA was $25,000,  or $105,451.00 in82
2016 dollars.  As a result of the Court’s invalidation of the aggregate contribution limit in
McCutcheon, the maximum aggregate contribution limit per individual is now estimated to be
$3,628,000 in an election cycle, if the individual gives the maximum permitted to each federal
  McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472 (Breyer, J., dissenting).83
  Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why An Overall Limit Matters,84
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/
mccutcheons-multiplying-effect-why.
   SpeechNow,org, 599 F.3d 692-95 (applying the reasoning of Citizens United to85
independent expenditure entities).
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candidate and entities associated with the candidates and parties.   In constant (2016) dollars, this83
is an increase of almost thirty times per individual contributor.  It is unlikely, however, that many,
if any, individuals will spend the theoretical maximum this way. Nevertheless, a watchdog group
found that 646 individuals had given “at or near the overall limit” before McCutcheon was
decided and, thus, that the increase in aggregate spending permitted could enable high wealth
individuals to greatly magnify their influence on particular candidates.   Also, although84
expenditures by individuals on express advocacy made independently of candidates, the parties,
and their committees were not capped at the time of Buckley, there was no counterpart ability of
individuals to combine their expenditures by contributing them, in unlimited amounts, to political
entities like Super PACs as there is today since the SpeechNow.org decision,  thereby amplifying85
their voices.   
In sum, wealthy individuals employing unlimited contribution vehicles now fund an
enormous share of the spending in federal campaigns.  The implications for Buckley 2.0's
reconsideration of the original Buckley are discussed in Parts II-III.
 C.  Outside Spending
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, “[o]ne of the most dramatic changes in
the federal political system in the last decade has been the explosion in outside spending.”  The
  See, e.g., WMP/CRP Special Report on Outside Group Activity, 2000-2016: Assessing86
Dark Money Trends and Magnitude, WESLYAN MEDIA PROJECT (Aug. 24, 2016) (hereafter
“WMP/CRP Report”), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
Report-on-Outside-Group-Activity-2000-2016.-WMP-CRP.pdf; Ian Vandewalker, Election
Spending 2016: Outside Groups Outspend Candidates and Parties in Key Senate Races,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 1, 2016)), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/ Election%20Spending%202016%20outside%20groups%20outspend.pdf.  Some
authorities consider political party committees as outside spending groups.  Since some political
party spending is coordinated with candidates and some is independent, parties may in fact be
outside groups when their spending is independent of candidates.
  The most commonly used are IRC §501(c)(4) social welfare groups, IRC §501(c)(5)87
labor organizations, and IRC §501(c)(6) trade associations and chambers of commerce.  
  See supra note 87. 88
  See FEC Press Release, Statistical summary of 24-month campaign activity of the89
2015-2016 election cycle, https://www.fec.gov/updates/
statistical-summary-24-month-campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle/ (stating that
independent expenditure only political committees spent $1.8 billion in 2015-2016).  Other
sources state that Super PACs spent $1,066,914,448 during that cycle in addition to more than
$200 million spent by exempt organizations; Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Outside Spending,
Total by Type of Spender, OPENSECRETS.COM, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
fes_summ.php?cycle=2016.  The statistics do not reflect election spending not reported to the
FEC, e.g., messages like electioneering communications broadcast outside the 300/60 day
regulated periods. Outside Spending in Elections, ISSUE ONE,
https://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/outside-spending.pdf.
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term “outside spending” often refers to entities other than candidates, their campaigns, and
political parties that spend money on elections.   The main examples of such entities are exempt86
organizations described in a subsection of 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,  section 52787
organizations, and Super PACs.  Most exempt organizations active in elections are social welfare
organizations, labor groups, and trade associations and chambers of commerce.    Together these88
groups and Super PACs are estimated to have spent between $1.5 and $1.8 billion in 2015-2016,
which represents more than 20% of the roughly $6.5 billion spent on that election.   This amount89
  See id.  Outside spending in 2012 accounted for 16.5% of total election spending, while90
in 2016, it was 21.7% of total election spending.  See id.  These amounts reflect only expenditures
reported to the FEC.  Other election related spending by outside groups is not captured by these
figures.  For parallel statistics that include spending by parties as outside spending, see WMP/CRP
Report, supra note 86. 
  See Soo Rin Kim, Midterms spending overview: Total expected to reach $5.2 billion,91
ABC News (Nov. 6, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/Politics/
midterms-spending-overview-total-cost-expected-reach-52/story?id=58996037.
  For a fuller account of Citizens United, its reasoning, and developments based upon92
that decision, see infra Part II.B.  This decision applies to union spending not funded by union
PACs as well.  See Union Facts, What Citizens United Means for Union Political Spending,
UNION FACTS,  https://www.unionfacts.com/article/political-money/ 
what-citizens-united-means-for-union-political-spending.
  On the FEC standard for independence, see infra Part II.B.5.93
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is almost 50% greater than the amount of outside spending in 2012.   During the 2018 mid-term90
elections, outside spending was roughly $1.3 billion, which represented a 60% increase over the
previous mid-term election.91
The term “outside spending” is intended to connote spending by groups or individuals that
are independent of candidates.  In order to be entitled to receive contributions that are not capped
by FECA contribution limits, the people and entities spending must be independent of candidates
because the Supreme Court first justified unlimited spending by corporations using their corporate
treasuries (instead of their PAC money) on the ground that there would be no possibility of
campaign corruption as long as corporate expenditures were not coordinated with a candidate.  92
One type of independent expenditure entity that arose in the wake of Citizens United and its
progeny was the Super PAC, which is “super” because it is permitted to receive contributions not
subject to FEC contribution limits as long as the Super PAC operates independent of candidates
and their campaigns, as independence is defined in the regulations implementing FECA.   It93
   In 2012, single-candidate Super PACS spent $268,904,425, https://94
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C.  In
2012, total Super PAC spending was $609,936,792, https://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012.  In 2016, single-candidate Super PACs spent almost
$530,000,000, see 2016 Outside Spending by Single-Candidate Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/ outsidespending/
summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C.  In 2016, total Super PAC spending was
$1,066,914,448, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S
   See Bradley A. Smith, Why the Media Hate Super PACs, NATIONAL REVIEW (Nov. 6,95
2015); Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United gives freedom of speech back to the people, REUTERS
(2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/
citizens-united-gives-freedom-of-speech-back-to-the-people.
  See Campaign Finance Institute, Independent Spending Dominated96
the Closest Senate and House Races in 2016, http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/16-11-10/
INDEPENDENT_SPENDING_DOMINATED_THE_CLOSEST_SENATE_AND_HOUSE_RA
CES_IN_2016.aspx; Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds
Candidate Spending, 2018 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/outvscand.php?cycle=2018 (listing 28 congressional and senate races in which
outside spending exceeded candidate spending, sometimes by large percentages).  There is a drop
down box that lists previous election cycles going back to 2000 (when there were zero instances). 
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should be noted, however, that a significant portion of Super PACs are single-candidate Super
PACs, that is, their expenditures are made exclusively on behalf of a single candidate, although
they do not coordinate their activities with that candidate, as coordination is defined by the FEC. 
In 2012, roughly 42% of the Super PAC spending was attributable to single-candidate Super
PACs; by 2016, half of Super PAC spending was attributable to them.   94
Is outside spending a bad thing?  Some have argued that outside money enables a wider
range of voices to be heard during campaigns than was possible when candidates and party
committees dominated campaign spending.   That may be true, given that FEC reports indicate95
that the amount of outside spending has surpassed the amount of candidate spending in a growing
number of races since 2008.   Who these newly empowered voices are, and whom or what they96
  See Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,97
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D.  By
clicking on the “Cycle” box, one can access donor data as far back as 2004.
  See supra note 52 and accompanying text.98
  See Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Political Nonprofits (Dark Money),99
OPENSECRETS.ORG (showing the total amount of spending by groups with no disclosure of
donors), https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php. 
  See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.100
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represent is only partially known. In the case of Super PACs, the names of individual donors are
revealing, while some of the entity names are revealing, and others are not.  Individuals, who are
responsible for roughly two-thirds of the Super PAC receipts, can be identified using lists
compiled by OpenSecrets.org and similar watchdog groups.   In contrast, as was noted earlier,97
exempt organizations are given great latitude to engage in campaign activities,  but they are not98
required to disclose their donors to the public.  In general, then, the origin of the hundreds of
millions of dollars spent by outside groups cannot be identified.  99
It is impossible, therefore, to know if outside spending in fact makes possible the
participation of a wide variety of voices that otherwise would not be heard, or would not be heard
effectively.  Based upon the fragmentary evidence available, it seems that much outside spending
consists of voices already well represented in elections that are now able to be greatly amplified by
means of unlimited contributions that are pooled in independent spending vehicles. The same
evidence shows that outside spending vehicles are increasingly dominated by mega-donations
contributed by a small number of high wealth individuals.  [finish–CED?  Targeted impacts] It100
seems, then, that the rapid growth of outside spending coupled with the dominance of
contributions by a tiny percentage of donors poses the risk that a handful of extremely wealthy
  Some issue ads can also be subject to regulation under provisions of the Internal101
Revenue Code prohibiting or restricting political campaign activity engaged in by exempt
organizations as well as through FECA regulation.  See, e.g., Rev. Ruls. 2004-6, 2006-1 C.B.
264, 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
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people rather than citizens at large, or donors generally, will derive the benefit afforded by this
new campaign finance phenomenon.
D.  Issue Advocacy
When Buckley was handed down, the art of creating issue ads designed to influence an
election without being subject to regulation  had not yet been refined, since it was the distinction101
drawn in Buckley between express advocacy and other campaign-related spending that spawned
an industry devoted to crafting electoral advertising arguably motivated by discussing issues
rather than candidates for elective office.  An issue ad is a public communication addressing a
subject of potential interest to the public, and it may be made to educate or persuade people about
a subject, with or without the intent to influence their vote in an election.  For example, in order
to persuade people to use reusable shopping bags, an environmental group may run ads informing
the public that discarded plastic bags end up in rivers and kill fish who ingest too many. 
The Buckley Court emphasized that issue advocacy enjoys the highest level of First
Amendment protection because discussion of issues is critical for ensuring an informed public and
because the First Amendment protects free expression to the greatest extent possible.  It ruled
that only communications during campaigns containing express advocacy could be subject to
regulation by the FEC because an attempt to regulate other forms of speech during elections
would pose a threat to the pure discussion of issues, especially when the difference between issue
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-44.102
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, n.52 (setting forth the “magic words” test).  Some103
commentators and courts have stated that few election ads contain express advocacy.  See
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127; BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NYU SCHOOL OF LAW,
STRAIGHT TALK ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION, PAPER NO. 5, MAGIC
WORDS (2009), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/paper5.pdf.  However,
FEC data indicate that since Citizens United was decided, and probably because of it, the rate of
spending on express advocacy has skyrocketed.  See Magleby, supra note 73, at 5 (stating that
total reported independent expenditures in 2016 were $1,631,002,075).
 See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions104
and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265 (2000). Brennan Center,
23-25, www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_10667.pdf.
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advocacy and campaign advocacy was unclear.   After invalidating regulation of anything except102
express advocacy, the Court noted that good lawyers would have no trouble authoring messages
that evaded FECA restrictions, since all they had to do was avoid words of express advocacy,
such as “elect” or “defeat” Joe Smith, or their equivalents.   The Court was prescient, and in103
ensuing years, the phrase “sham issue advocacy” was coined to describe issue ads communicated
with the intent to influence votes for candidates while evading FECA campaign restrictions
imposed upon express advocacy, such as disclosure rules and rules requiring “hard” or PAC
money to fund those communications.   Using the plastic bag example, urging people to stop104
using plastic bags because of the environmental harm is pure advocacy.  A similar ad broadcast
near an election that also notes which candidates support or oppose a “bag tax” may be intended
to influence how people vote in that election, but it would not be subject to regulation, despite its
motivation, because it lacks words explicitly calling for the election or defeat of a candidate. 
In 2002, Congress sought to curb the unregulated use of issue ads likely aimed at
influencing voters’ choice of candidates by amending FECA to include a new category of
  See 52 U.S.C. §30104(f)(3).  Electioneering communications are defined to include105
only ads using broadcast, cable, and satellite media, not print or other media.  Id. at
§30104(f)(3)(A)(I). 
  The provision was part of a larger campaign finance reform effort.  See supra note 19.106
 McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).107
  See Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. 449 (2007)108
(holding that the provision could only apply to electioneering communications that were the
functional equivalent of express advocacy).
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 109
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campaign speech called “electioneering communications.”  The new category was defined to
include communications using broadcast media (but not print or mail) that mention or otherwise
refer to a specific federal candidate and that are made in the 30 days before a primary or 60 days
before an election, if the ads target at least 50,000 members of the relevant electorate for that
candidate.  The new provisions compelled the disclosure of the amounts and sources of105
electioneering communications and, if the funders of the communications were corporations or
labor unions, the provisions required them to use PAC funds to pay for the ads.  106
The electioneering provisions were upheld against a constitutional challenge in McConnell
v. FEC.   However, in 2007, the Supreme Court revised and narrowed the definition of an107
electioneering communication so that it included little more than express advocacy.   In 2010,108
Citizens United held that corporations and unions could use treasury funds to pay for express
advocacy and electioneering communications as long as the communications were not
coordinated with a candidate or campaign.   The result of Citizens United was thus to restore109
corporations’ ability to spend potentially unlimited amounts on issue ads intended to influence
voting for specific candidates, even if they refer to the candidates and even if they are broadcast
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368-71.  On the standards for coordination, see infra110
Part II.B.5.
  See supra note 20.111
  For a detailed discussion of disclosure rules that apply to certain issue ads, see What112
Super PACs, Non-Profits, and other Groups Spending Money Must Disclose about the Source
and Use of their Funds, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrests.org/outsidespending/rules.php.
  Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997-113
1998 Election Cycle, http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/CLR/100CLR620/report.htm.
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on the eve of primaries and elections, as long as the corporations do not coordinate with the
candidates or their campaigns. 
The amounts spent on issue ads intended to influence federal campaigns is difficult to
capture since such spending is not in general disclosed in public records.  However, Wisconsin
Right to Life and Citizens United left undisturbed the disclosure rules pertaining to the original
definition of electioneering communications, so that individuals and groups that fund issue ads
mentioning or otherwise identifying a candidate in the period before a primary or election must
continue to report to the FEC.   In that event, the identities of individuals and groups who110
finance such communications will become public, as will the amounts they give for that purpose. 
However, since the definition does not include ads in print media, mail, or social media (even in
the period before a primary or election) and it only covers broadcast advertising during that time
frame,  most election-related advocacy will not need to be disclosed.  Thus, most amounts spent111
on issue ads targeted to influence elections but not subject to reporting as independent
expenditures cannot be known with any precision.   Spending on issue ads in the 1997-1998112
congressional election cycle has been estimated at between $135 million and $150 million.   The113
  JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 97-91, SOFT AND HARD114
MONEY IN CONTEMPORARY ELECTIONS: WHAT FEDERAL LAW DOES AND DOES NOT REGULATE 5
(Mar. 15, 2007). 
  See https://www.opensecrets.org/resources/10things/03.php.  Organizations exempt115
under sections 501(c)(4)-(6) of the I.R.C. can engage in various kinds of campaign activity as
long as such activity (combined with other activities not components of their exempt purpose)
does not become their primary activity.  See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2).
  This area is in flux.  The existing regulation, 11 CFR §109.10(e)(1)(vi), only mandated116
reporting of donors if the donors made contributions earmarked for a specific independent
expenditure.  In August of 2018, this regulation was struck down as inconsistent with the
underlying statute, but enforcement was stayed 45 days to give the FEC time to publish an interim
regulation consistent with the broader reach of the statute (52 U.S.C. §30104(c)).  See CREW v.
FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018).  Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the decision pending its
appeal was denied.  904 F.3d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2018); aff’d Crossroads Grassroots Policy
Strategies v. CREW, 201 L. Ed. 2d 1128, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 4208 (Sept. 18, 2018).  The merits
of the issue remain to be decided.  In the meantime, the FEC has not provided adequate guidance
and only a small portion of groups reporting expenditures to the FEC have also reported the
identities of their donors.  See Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, New Reports Show Why the
FEC Needs to nlarify Disclosure Requirements for Dark Money Groups–and Why Congress
Should Go Even Further, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (Feb. 6, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/
update/new-reports-show-why-fec-needs-clarify-disclosure-requirements-dark-money-groups-and
-why.
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Annenberg Public Policy Center estimated that $509 million was spent on broadcast issue ads
alone in 2000.   In 2010, according to OpenSecrets.org, tax-exempt social welfare organizations114
spent $127 million on ads and other electoral activities, and they spent $308 million in 2012.  115
They are not, however, in general required to reveal the identities of their contributors, and even
when they make required disclosures for independent expenditures, they may not be required to
disclose the identities of donors unless the donors earmarked their contributions specifically for
reportable expenditures.   Similarly, figures for “political ad” spending are not helpful because116
they include numerous kinds of campaign   advertising other than issue advocacy intended to
  See, e.g., Open Secrets News, Low transparency, low regulation online political ads117
skyrocket (Mar. 7, 2018) (summarizing spending on both broadcast and online ads since 2010), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/low-transparency-low-regulation-online-political-ads-
skyrocket/.
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44, 45.118
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influence votes on candidates.117
In short, although there may have been campaign-oriented issue advocacy at the time
Buckley was litigated, there are no precise (or even imprecise) estimates of the amounts spent on
such activity then.  Similarly, it is impossible to quantify such issue advocacy today.  Because
outside group spending has skyrocketed since Citizens United, and much spending by outside
groups appears to be campaign-oriented, the phenomenon of campaign ads masquerading as issue
advocacy, which Buckley predicted,  has contributed to record campaign spending by118
commercial and non-commercial interests, whether funded by individuals or groups.
E.  Conclusion
Hard data relating to many contemporary campaign practices is difficult or impossible to
obtain, largely because of the absence of disclosure requirements in existing law, but also because
of stratagems adopted by those who wish to influence the outcome of elections by injecting large
amounts of money while remaining invisible.  Despite this, there is an abundance of evidence that
there has been rapid growth in the relative size of money attributable to business interests in the
total mix of campaign spending and even more massive increases in the amounts spent by high
wealth individuals who spend millions or tens of millions of dollars to influence the outcome of
federal campaigns.  These changes have profound implications for policymakers and lawmakers
that are beyond the scope of the present analysis. These changes may also have consequences for
  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (per curiam) (1976).119
  See Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo, The World According to, and After120
McCutcheon v. FEC, and Why It Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533 (2015); Note: Eliminating the
FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2018).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.  The cap also applied to contributions to intermediaries if121
earmarked for candidates.  Id. at 24. 
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the application of the legal doctrines and reasoning set forth in the Buckley decision more than
forty years ago.  It is the latter concerns that Parts II-III and the Buckley 2.0 thought experiment
address.
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DOCTRINE
The main issues discussed in Buckley were limits on campaign contributions, limits on
independent expenditures, aggregate limits, public financing, and the creation and operation of the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).   Although much could be said about all of these subjects,119 120
Buckley 2.0 will focus on the first two, which constitute the largest part of the campaign finance
discussion today.
A.  Contributions to Candidates
The contribution question in Buckley was whether the newly enacted $1,000 cap on
contributions to candidates and their campaign committees was constitutional.   The challengers121
argued that the caps impermissibly burdened their freedom of speech and especially their freedom
of political expression.  The Supreme Court upheld the limits.  It argued, first, that the burden on
individuals unable to give candidates more than $1,000 per primary and an additional $1,000 in the
general election was real but “only a marginal restriction” on their free speech and, second, that the
government interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was “a
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21, 26-27.122
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 24.123
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (noting that a contribution indicates support for a124
candidate, but without “communicat[ing] the underlying basis for the support”).
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (stating that contributions involve “speech by someone125
other than the contributor”).
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 24.126
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22, 28.127
  See FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-443, §101(a), 88 Stat. 1263.128
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constitutionally sufficient justification” for imposing this burden.   The Court considered the limit122
a marginal restriction for two reasons.  First, it viewed contributions as symbolic speech  since123
they show general support for a candidate, but do not translate directly into an expression of
support for specific views or reasons.   A candidate can, for example, use contributed funds for124
ads or activities relating to issues not important to the donor; thus, the political expression funded
would be a choice made by the recipient of the money rather than the donor.  The highest degree
of First Amendment protection goes to the donor’s own speech rather than that of the recipient of
the donor’s largesse.   Buckley also stated that contribution limits are a marginal burden because125
they do not “in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues,”126
since contributors can still make independent expenditures, join political groups, and volunteer to
advance their political views.127
One question Buckley 2.0 would consider today is whether the current limit on individuals’
contributions to candidates is unconstitutionally small.  The maximum contribution to a candidate
at the time of Buckley was $1,000 per primary or election,  which would be $4,486 for each in128
  FEC, Contribution limits for 2015-2016,129
https://www.fec.gov/updates/contribution-limits-for-2015-2016.  Individuals can give additional
amounts to federal PACs, national party committees, and state/district/local party committees. See
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/
candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits.
  BCRA, supra note 19, §307(a), (d). 130
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.131
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.132
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.133
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2016 dollars. The maximum that individuals could contribute to a candidate in a primary or a
general election in 2015-2016 was $2,700,  or roughly 60% of the Buckley era inflation-adjusted129
amount.  Current contribution limits have not kept pace with the Buckley era limits because
Congress did not initially peg them to inflation.  It was not until 2002 that Congress increased the
maximum individual contribution to candidates for primaries and elections from $1,000 to $2,000
and also provided for an inflation adjustment to that amount by election cycle.130
The $1,000 limit on contributions was challenged in the original Buckley as
unconstitutional because larger contributions would not raise the threat of corruption, which was
the government’s justification for imposing the limits.   The Court first stated that Congress131
could constitutionally conclude that some limit is necessary to avoid corruption or its
appearance.   It then conceded that Congress could have created a different standard, but held132
that its failure to do so did not make the provision invalid as long as the limit chosen was narrowly
tailored to prevent the harm described.   The Court also quoted with approval the appellate133
court’s statement that it is not for a court to decide whether the limit should be $2,000 or $1,000,
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975).134
   See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 22.  The Buckley Court found that the plaintiff had failed135
to produce evidence that contribution limits “in themselves” discriminate unfairly between
challengers and incumbents.  Id. at 31-33.
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-32; Shrink v. Missouri Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377,136
403-404 (2000); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248-49 (2006).
  Buckley 424 U.S. at 21.137
  See https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/138
candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits.  The cap is $2,800 per election, per candidate, for
2019-2020.  
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once Congress found that some limit was necessary to avoid corruption or its appearance.  For134
the Buckley Court, the test was whether the contribution limits “prevented candidates and political
committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”   All candidates need135
sufficient resources, but the effective advocacy standard  is especially critical for challengers who
hope to replace incumbents but are hampered because of the many tangible and intangible benefits
of incumbency their opponents enjoy.   The Buckley Court exhibited an attitude of deference to136
the legislature’s judgments when it upheld the $1,000 limit, explaining that the limit would not
have “any dramatic adverse effect” on raising campaign funds, and it indicated that Congress was
free to choose $1,000 rather than $2,000 since the former did not preclude effective advocacy by
candidates.   137
Buckley 2.0 would apply the effective advocacy test of the original Buckley to assess the
validity of the contribution cap for individuals ($2,700 for each primary and election in 2015-
2016), which will be adjusted for inflation regularly.   It would likely start by reviewing judicial138
decisions since Buckley that addressed challenges to contribution caps.  The most recent and
relevant such case, Randall v. Sorrell, itself summarized the history of state and federal challenges
  Randall, 548 U.S. at 247 (citing Shrink, supra note 136, and California Medical Assn.139
v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981)).
  Randall, 548 U.S. at 247-48.140
  Randall, 548 U.S. at 253.  The Vermont contribution caps were among the lowest in141
the nation, and they were a small fraction of the limits approved in Buckley, almost thirty years
earlier.  Id. at 250-51.  For example, the statute required volunteers to treat their expenses as
contributions, id. at 259-60, which could severely restrict how much volunteering people could do
if, for example, they incurred transportation costs.
  Randall, 548 U.S. at 252.142
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to contribution limits.  It noted that “the Court has consistently upheld contribution limits.”   At139
the same time, even cases upholding contribution limits have cautioned that low limits can have the
effect of making it difficult for challengers to challenge incumbents successfully.140
In Randall, which examined Vermont’s contribution limits relating to several state-wide
offices, the Court held that the limits were unconstitutional.  It emphasized that its ruling did not
rest exclusively on the “extremely low” dollar limits of $200-$400, depending upon the office;
rather, the state had also imposed severe restraints on political parties and volunteers.   Further,141
the dollar limits were not indexed for inflation.   Thus, the Court suspended its usual deference to142
lawmakers’ assessments of what is necessary to avoid the threat of corruption or its appearance
when very low dollar limits were combined with associated campaign constraints in such a way as
to make effective advocacy difficult. 
Buckley 2.0 would certainly apply the doctrinal norms these cases reflect to the empirical
reality of contemporary campaign funding.  Several watchdog groups and nonpartisan
organizations have gathered and analyzed data about the sources of campaign contributions and
the characteristics of donors that would aid the Court in reaching a decision.  In the last three
  See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 61, 31-33  (Tables 1-4A- 1-4C) (individual143
contributions to all presidential candidates in primaries); 41 (Table 1-8) individual contributions to
general election presidential candidates); 13-14, 61-62 (Tables 2-8, 2-9) (individual contributions
to House and Senate candidates).  The statistics for Congressional candidates are  less revealing
because contributions of $1,000 or more are not further subdivided.  For example, in 2012,
roughly 50% of Mitt Romney’s receipts from individuals were less than the $2,500 cap in that
election cycle, compared with 78% for Barack Obama.  Id.  http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/
federal/2016Report/pdf/CFI_Federal-CF_16_Table1-08.pdf. See also infra note145.
  See Persily, Bauer, & Ginsberg, supra note 72, at 22-23 (noting that 3.2 million people144
made contributions to federal campaigns in 2016 compared to roughly 66,000 in 1982); Zachary
Albert, Trends in Campaign Financing, 1980-2016, REPORT FOR THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE TASK
FORCE 16-17, Oct. 12, 2017 (noting that the number of individual contributors increased 487%
during this period). 
 See Albert, supra note 144, at 17 (noting that the average total contribution from each145
individual “has declined sharply since 1982" and that the average individual contribution was less
in 2016 than in any election since 1982).  The figures are direct contributions from individuals to
all candidates per election, and not to each candidate.  Id.
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29, 36.146
  In 2018, ActBlue raised over $1.2 billion for 145 Democratic House and Senate147
candidates.  Lisa Lerer, ActBlue, the Democrats’ Not-So-Secret Weapon, N.Y. Times (Nov. 16,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/on-politics-actblue-democrats.html.  Of
this amount, $296 million was in small donations.  Id.  ActBlue raised a total of $1.6 billion in
2018; it raises money for state and federal candidates, and it also raises money for party
committees and other organizations.  See ActBlue, 2018 Election Cycle in Review,
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presidential election cycles, there were wide variations in the percentage of total contributions to
candidates that were small ($200 or less) or larger, up to the election or election cycle limit.   The143
Court would undoubtedly note the dramatic increase in the number of individual contributors to
federal campaigns,  while the inflation-adjusted average contribution per individual has144
decreased.   This suggests that current contribution limits have not discouraged participation by145
individuals in elections, which was a concern of Buckley.   In fact, internet platforms that comply146
with FEC contribution regulations, like ActBlue, have facilitated the growth of small and medium-
sized donations to candidates.  147
https://report.actblue.com. Almost 64% of donors on ActBlue were first-time donors, and their
contributions were 37% of the money raised on the platform.  See id. 
  See FEC, Contribution limits, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/148
candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-limits.
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.149
  See supra Part I.C.150
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Because many sources aggregate a donor’s contributions to candidates, parties, and other
recipients, it is difficult to determine whether $2,700/$5,400 per candidate per election cycle (or
$2,800 for 2019-2020) is too low, since it may be only one piece of a donor’s giving.  As was true
when the original Buckley was decided, donors can also give to party committees of various
kinds,  in addition to outside groups such as PACs, super PACs, and exempt organizations.  As a148
consequence, whether the limits on contributions to candidates are large enough to make possible
effective advocacy by candidates cannot be determined in a vacuum, i.e., without reference to
other campaign rules, including those that have emerged since the original Buckley.  Among other
things, Buckley 2.0 would review the holdings in Citizens United and McCutcheon before reaching
a conclusion about the appropriateness of the limits on contributions by individuals to candidates,
measured by effective advocacy.  
The original Buckley had expressed the view that independent spending on behalf of a
candidate by third parties could be significantly less helpful to the candidate than the candidate’s
own spending and that outside spending could even undermine or otherwise harm the candidate’s
message.   Buckley 2.0 might, then, view the huge sums of outside spending in recent elections149 150
as a threat to a candidate’s effective advocacy.  In that event, the Court could find caps on
contributions by individuals to candidates too low in the current campaign finance environment to
  See supra note 96.151
  See infra notes 214-222 and accompanying text (on coordination).152
  For example, the statistics quoted for the 2015-2016 election cycle may reflect the153
impact of McCutcheon, which removed aggregate caps per election.  Buckley 2.0 might also
envision the implications for effective advocacy if Citizens United ans SpeechNow.org were no
longer good law.
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enable candidates themselves to raise enough money to control their campaign’s message. It would
note that in some races, the amount of outside spending exceeds the amount of spending by the
candidate.   Alternatively, Buckley 2.0 might conclude that many Super PACs, especially single-151
candidate Super PACs, are “outside” groups in name only since the alleged barrier between the
group and the candidate is so porous that much, if not most, single-candidate Super PAC spending
will clearly supplement or be the equivalent of candidate spending.   152
Buckley 2.0's final conclusion regarding individual contribution limitations, then, must
await its assessment of other aspects of the contemporary electoral landscape, both empirical and
doctrinal.   For the present, Buckley 2.0 is likely to conclude that pre-McCutcheon aggregate153
limits had the effect of depressing the amounts individuals could give to multiple candidates
because the aggregate cap created a zero sum game in which giving the maximum contribution to
nine candidates would make it impossible to contribute to others.  In that event, taking into
account the failure of contribution limits for individuals to keep pace with inflation, the rate of
increase in the cost of campaigns, and the ability of outside spending to overwhelm candidate
spending, Buckley 2.0 may well find the pre-McCutcheon contribution limits on individual
contributions to candidates unconstitutionally small, despite its acknowledged deference to
Congress regarding appropriate restrictions to guard against corruption or its appearance.  The
  See SpeecNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc)..154
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 692-95.155
  See Albert W. Alschuler, Laurence H. Tribe, Norman L. Eisen, Richard W. Painter,156
Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACs Should Survive Citizens United, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2299 (2018); Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon,
Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 390, 471-476 (2015).  See also Richard L.
Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 DUKE J.
44
reason would be that the original Buckley also established effective advocacy as an independent
principle guiding its deliberations.  By the same token, if Buckley 2.0 finds the McCutcheon
decision valid in light of contemporary campaign practices, it would likely leave intact the current
rates coupled with FECA’s formula for raising dollar amounts on a regular basis. 
B.  Contributions to Independent Spending Groups
The original Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent expenditures, that is,
amounts spent on expressly advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates for federal
office.  Although it did not consider unlimited contributions to independent expenditure groups,
the Buckley decision will inform Buckley 2.0's analysis through its reasoning about the relationship
between the threat of corruption and the character of independent actors.
1.  The genesis of unlimited contributions to independent spending groups.
Unlimited donations to independent spending groups were first authorized by
SpeechNow.org, an appellate court decision in 2010.   The court relied upon the Citizens United154
Court’s assertion that independent corporate spending could never give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption and extended that holding to contributions made by individuals or groups
to independent spending entities.   Some commentators and courts have challenged155
SpeechNow.org’s holding.   The Supreme Court, however, has never reviewed the decision or156
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 15 (2014) (stating that “the arguments for individual contribution
limits applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate reliable Super PACs appear
to be very close to each other and roughly similar in strength”). A few courts have also resisted
the holding.  See Alschuler, Tribe, Eisen & Painter, at 2308-10, 2311. 
  Cf. Hasen, supra note 156, at 11.157
  The plaintiffs in Citizens United originally challenged the constitutionality of the158
electioneering communication as applied to them; however, the Court initiated the larger issue and
had the case re-briefed.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321-22. 
  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360-61.159
  See supra note 154.160
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the central issue.157
In Citizens United, the Court challenged the FECA provision requiring corporations,
unions, and certain other institutions to fund their campaign contributions and their independent
expenditures with money amassed in PACs rather than with general revenues derived from their
business revenues (treasury funds).   The restrictions imposed by FECA on raising PAC money158
meant that these entities would likely have less to spend on campaign activities than would have
been available from their treasury funds.  The Citizens United Court concluded that the rules
prohibiting campaign spending from treasury funds were unconstitutional if corporations or unions
act independently of candidates because independent action precludes the possibility of corruption,
which can only exist if there is a quid pro quo arrangement between candidates and those who act
on their behalf.   In short, absent coordination, no quid pro quo; absent quid pro quo, no159
possibility of corruption.
The same year, the appellate court in SpeechNow.org held that it was unconstitutional for
the government to cap contributions that individuals and others make to organizations involved in
campaigns, if the organizations act independently of candidates and their campaigns.   The160
  599 F.3d at 693.161
  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693, citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357, quoting162
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  The result would be the same if the money was spent to defeat a
candidate’s opponent.
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693 (using “diminishes” to163
refer to the Buckley Court’s caveat). 
  435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).164
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SpeechNow,org court argued that in Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that “the
government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures.”   As the161
SpeechNow.org court noted, to reach its conclusion Citizens United relied upon the observation
made in Buckley that the absence of coordination between a candidate and someone spending
money to help the  candidate “alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”   “Alleviates,” however, means reduces; it162
does not mean precludes or prevents.  Therefore, the Buckley Court added the further observation
that advocacy funded by independent expenditures “does not presently appear to pose dangers of
real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.”  163
The implication of “presently” is that it is in principle possible that independent spending could at
some time come to pose a danger of real or apparent corruption equal to that of large
contributions.  Noting this implication, the SpeechNow.org court pointed out that the Supreme
Court in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti had stated in a footnote that Congress might
present evidence that independent corporate expenditures on behalf of a candidate could present “a
danger of real or apparent corruption,”  even though Bellotti also held that no such danger164
existed in that case because the challenge concerned a ballot initiative rather than an election
  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693-94. The observation was in a footnote, but it was165
dictum in any event because the case challenged a law preventing corporations spending general
funds to influence a ballot initiative, not the election of a candidate.
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693-94 (referring to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of166
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990), upholding a state prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures, and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003), upholding the federal
prohibition on corporate expenditures for electioneering communications enacted in 2002).  Both
decisions were overturned by Citizens United.
  SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694.  See Douglas M. Spencer and Abby K. Wood,167
Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89
IND. L. J. 315, 318-19 (2014) (calling Citizens United’s assertion a “legal fiction” that reveals the
Court’s complete indifference to what actually causes corruption as an empirical matter in favor
of a blanket assertion without evidentiary support).
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involving candidates potentially subject to corruption.   The SpeechNow.org court also165
mentioned two subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court that upheld laws designed to prevent
corruption associated with independent corporate spending.  166
 Despite these precedents, the SpeechNow.org court, following Citizens United, concluded
that Congress had no interest at all in limiting contributions by the plaintiff groups in its own case
because Citizens United had held as “a matter of law” that independent expenditures could never
pose a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption.   The SpeechNow.org court thus167
presented Citizens United’s rationale as a conceptual or logical argument, namely, that the
definition of corruption presupposes parties acting in a concerted way, while an independent group
is by definition not acting in concert with the candidate. Further, the SpeechNow.org court also
noted that Citizens United had asserted that corruption means quid pro quo corruption for
campaign finance purposes and that quid pro quo means agreement by one party to do something
specific for another party in exchange for financial or other support by the other party on the first
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694.168
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694, referencing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357-59.169
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 695 (stating that “the First Amendment cannot be170
encroached upon for naught”).
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party’s behalf.   168
The SpeechNow.org court also traced the history of Supreme Court decisions incorporating
a broader understanding of corruption than quid pro quo arrangements as construed in Citizens
United, namely, the view that corruption includes gaining influence with or access to an official, in
addition to obtaining a specific benefit.  Citizens United rejected the broader understanding in
favor of a narrow definition that implies the impossibility of independent expenditures corrupting
as a matter of law.   The SpeechNow.org court then concluded that, based upon this position of169
Citizens United, the government could also have no interest in regulating independent electoral
spending by persons other than corporations, including contributions by individuals to independent
expenditure organizations, because there was zero threat of corruption to balance against the
fundamental interest of political speech in the form of contributions to such organizations.   The170
SpeechNow.org decision thus articulated as a constitutional right unlimited giving to electoral
entities as long as those entities operate independently of candidates for public office.
Buckley 2.0 would evaluate these developments with the benefit of hindsight.  In particular,
in addition to applying the doctrines it set forth in the original Buckley opinion to contemporary
electoral practices, it would have eight years of history with which to assess the impact of Citizens
United and SpeechNow.org on those practices.  Since the original Buckley repeatedly used
statistics to support its arguments, it is reasonable to assume that Buckley 2.0 would also consider
  See supra note 170.171
  See Alschuler, Tribe, Eisen & Painter, supra note 156, at 2308-12.172
  See Alschuler, Tribe, Eisen & Painter, supra note 156, at 2311-12.  They mention as173
examples sugar subsidies, tax provisions, and arms deals that Congress approves, even if agency
staff oppose such acts of favoritism.  Id.  They also argue that if the independence of a recipient
organization necessarily precluded or cleansed possible corruption taint associated with donors to
independent spending groups, there would be no reason to have laws barring contributions by
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empirical evidence in reaching its conclusions today.
2.  Buckley 2.0 ‘s analysis of unlimited contributions and the threat of corruption-new
facts on the ground.
There are several areas in which Buckley 2.0 might reach a different conclusion than the
court reached in SpeechNow.org.  The first of these is the SpeechNow.org court’s conclusion that
the government’s interest in regulating contributions to independent spending groups is a “naught”
because independent or uncoordinated spending simply does not pose a threat of corruption or the
appearance of corruption.   171
Buckley 2.0 would identify significant problems with this conclusion.  As has been noted by
several constitutional law scholars, it does not follow logically from the fact that groups are
themselves engaged in independent spending (and, thus, may pose no threat of corruption, using
the Citizens United definition) that contributions to these groups by individuals or other entities
also pose no threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption.   The fallacy, they argue, is the172
failure to recognize that “[i]t is the six- seven-, and eight-figure donations to super PACs that
create the appearance (and likely the reality) of corruption, not the groups’ expenditures” because
ordinary people recognize that office holders reward with legislation or other favors those who
write the large checks, not the recipient groups.   For example, in the eight years since Citizens173
government contractors or foreign persons.  See id.
  See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, One-fifth of all super-PAC money, from just eleven pockets,174
Washington Post (Oct. 27, 2018), A14.  See also supra notes 73-78 (documenting the small
number of donors responsible for two-thirds or more of contributions to Super PACs).
  Lee, supra note 174.  The constitutional scholars cited above also argue that Citizens175
United’s claim that independent spending poses no threat of corruption as a matter of law was
actually dictum in the case, since it was unnecessary to reach a decision in the case after the Court
concluded that “the First Amendment prohibits ‘restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some and not by others.’”  Alschuler, Tribe, Eisen & Painter, supra
note 156, at 2312, quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340, which was paraphrasing First Nat.
Bank of Boston v.  Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).  The authors also argue that the Court
resolved the case a second time when it stated that only quid pro quo corruption counts as
corruption.  Id.
  See supra note 116.  However, earmarked contributions are rarely reported.  See id.176
  See https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D (2018);177
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&disp=D&type=V&superon
ly=N (2016).  The names listed are of individuals.  As was noted earlier, the names of groups can
be unrevealing (at least to the public).
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United was decided, a mere eleven donors contributed more than $1 billion to Super PACs, which
was 20% of all the money raised by those groups during that time.   The largest donor gave174
almost $78 million to Republican candidates in 2016, which included $20 million to a single
candidate running for President.   175
Buckley 2.0 would likely assess empirically the proposition that contributions to Super
PACs or other independent expenditure groups cannot lead to corruption or the appearance of
corruption by taking into account the extraordinary size of such contributions.  Super PACs, dark
money groups that receive earmarked contributions, and section 527 organizations all are required
to disclose the names of their donors and the amounts of their donations, which then become a
matter of public record.   As a result, the 100 contributors of the largest amounts in each election176
cycle are listed on the website of OpenSecrets.org.   Since roughly half of Super PACs are single-177
  See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.178
  See Top Individuals Funding Outside Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,179
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D&type=V&superon
ly=N, Top Organizations Funding Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG,  https://
www.opensecrets.org/ outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D&type=O&superonly=N.
  See Jeremy W Peters, Sheldon Adelson Sees a Lot to Like in Trump’s Washington,180
N.Y. Times (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/
us/politics/adelson-trump-republican-donor.html.  For example, the recognition of Jerusalem as
the capital of Israel and decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, both
urged by Adelson, occurred even before other Trump campaign promises, such as moving
forward on building a wall between the United States and Mexico, which energizes the vast
majority of Trump’s most ardent supporters. The timing suggests that the priority he gave to the
move, if not the inclination to make the move in the first place, can be traced to the campaign
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candidate organizations,  candidates can easily know, for example, which individuals or entities178
have each contributed millions of dollars to support them or defeat their opponents.  Even in the
case of dark money groups that do not disclose their donors to the public, candidates are likely to
know which individuals and entities are contributing huge amounts because, although such groups
cannot coordinate their activities with candidates, no law prohibits them from disclosing the names
of their donors and the amounts donated to candidates, if they choose.  Thus, the public is in the
dark; but the beneficiary candidates undoubtedly will not be.
In 2008, the last election before Citizens United was decided, only three individuals and
four entities gave sums in excess of $1 million to outside groups.   Regardless of whether the179
Supreme Court’s claim that independent spending could pose no threat of corruption was accurate
at that time, the explosion of unlimited spending in the decade after Citizens United makes that
assumption no longer tenable.  For example, it is difficult to decouple one donor’s $20 million
contribution to Donald Trump’s campaign from various actions the Trump administration has
taken that were specifically requested by that donor.   Although there is probably no way to180
contribution and Adelson’s influence.  Trump also acted quickly on tax cuts favoring the wealthy
over the middle class, which may also reflect the influence of large donors to the campaign.
  Some argue that those who donate huge sums do so because the candidate already is181
committed to the policies the donor favors.  Anthony Fowler & Haritz Garro, When Corporations
Donate to Candidates, Are They Buying Influence? KELLOGG INSIGHT (2018),
https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/do-corporate-campaign-contributions-buy-influenc
e. While undoubtedly true, it is not credible that the fact of huge contributions would not affect
the priority the recipient assigns to his or her campaign promises.
  See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text. 182
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prove the impact of huge campaign contributions on a recipient,  in many instances the181
appearance of a connection is obvious.
In short, when assessing the proposition that independent expenditures preclude a threat of
corruption as a matter of law, Buckley 2.0 would take into account new facts on the ground,
namely, the vast sums injected into campaigns on an ostensibly independent basis. These are facts
that did not exist in 2010 and that the justices making that decision could not have anticipated.
Buckley 2.0 would ask whether at some point what begins as a matter of degree becomes a matter
of kind.  Buckley 2.0 would also consider whether the emergence of single-candidate independent
expenditure Super PACs, responsible for almost two-thirds of a billion dollars in the 2015-2016
election cycle alone and accounting for an increasingly large percentage of total campaign
spending, has led to a circumstance where the formal independence of expenditures can no longer
be presumed to alleviate the threat of corruption.  Finally, focusing specifically on the holding of
SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would find that nothing in the law prevents the contributors to
independent expenditure groups from coordinating with candidates, even if the groups themselves
do not.  182
3.  Buckley 2.0 ‘s analysis of the meaning of corruption and quid pro quo.
  See SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694, quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.  On183
the changes in the meaning of corruption in Supreme Court opinions, see RICHARD L. HASEN,
LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS (2014).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, n.28, citing Buckley (D.C. Cir.), 519 F.2d at 839-840, and184
nn. 36-38.
  Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.185
  Buckley 951 F.2d at 840, nn. 36, 37.  The footnotes cited by the Buckley Court also186
mentioned large donors who saw their contributions as necessary “to be actively considered” for
ambassadorships.  Id. at n.38. 
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In addition to reviewing the impact of unlimited giving on the original Buckley’s
assumption that independent spending is unlikely to pose a threat of corruption, Buckley 2.0 would
certainly take issue with the definition of corruption assumed by SpeechNow.org, based upon
Citizens United, i.e., that corruption refers exclusively to quid pro quo corruption, and not
“[i]ngratiation and access.”  This interpretation of quid pro quo corruption, Buckley 2.0 would183
point out, misstates what the original Buckley said.  When Buckley identified corruption with
“political quid pro quos,” it cited as support the opinion of the Court of Appeals and expressly
cited footnotes in that decision summarizing parts of the record.   Both the appellate Buckley184
opinion and the footnotes cited there characterized quid pro quo situations in terms of influence as
well as bribery or an exchange of a contribution for a specific favor by an office holder.  In addition
to describing the problem campaign finance law was addressing as “undue influence,”  the185
appellate court included among illustrative examples large contributions made “in order to gain a
meeting with White House officials” and testimony that donors were “motivated by the perception
that this ...would get us in the door and make our point of view heard.”   To the same effect, the186
original Buckley mentions “improper influence,” “undue influence,” “the “appearance of
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, 30, 45, 53, 58, 76.  See also id. at 256-57 (characterizing187
the aim of FECA as countering “the risk of undue influence) (Chief Justice Burger, concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 260, 261(referring to the aim of contribution limits as
“preventing undue influence” and “improper[] influence”) (Justice White, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28.188
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.189
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-361 (distinguishing quid pro quo corruption190
from ingratiation and favoritism, which it equates with responsiveness to constituents).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.191
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impropriety,” and “buy[ing] influence” repeatedly to describe the evils that Congress sought to
counter with FECA, which suggests that the Court saw FECA as addressing problems beyond
bribery or specific trades of money for concrete favors.   Further, the original Buckley explicitly187
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the law’s contribution limits were unconstitutional because bribery
laws and disclosure requirements were a less restrictive means of treating quid pro quo
arrangements.   The Buckley Court countered that “giving and taking of bribes deal with only the188
most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence government action,”189
implying that “corruption” in the campaign finance context covers less blatant and specific attempts
to affect official actions and policies. 
Buckley 2.0 might also observe that Citizens United appears to understand corruption as
discrete transactions in which contributors exchange large donations for specific acts by office
holders,  whereas for the original Buckley, “the impact of the appearance of corruption stem[s]190
from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions.”   The notion of “a regime” of large contributions and the threat of “abuse191
inherent” in such a regime refers to more than occasional discrete acts of bribery; it suggests a
  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359.  Citizens United quotes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in192
McConnell as well, id., but fails to note that Justice Kennedy was concurring in part with the
decision’s holding and concurring and dissenting in part with its reasoning.  The portion quoted
forms part of Kennedy’s disagreement with the McConnell majority.  
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.193
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climate in which the influence of those who make large contributions is pervasive.  Thus, Buckley
2.0 would likely conclude that when Citizens United ruled that the “fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt” and
implied that favoritism by representatives is the equivalent of legitimate responsiveness, not
corruption,  the Citizens United Court was disregarding the original Buckley and its broader192
understanding of corruption.  
The original Buckley’s interpretation of the scope of quid pro quo corruption is consistent
with, indeed, part and parcel of the original Buckley’s concern with preserving “the integrity of our
system of representative government.”   For the initial Buckley, corruption was problematic193
because it threatened the integrity of representative government.  Eliminating corruption was thus
a means to a more foundational end, the integrity of the electoral system that insures that the U.S.
government will be truly representative. In fact, Buckley 2.0 might well diagnose the main error of
Citizens United as that Court’s attempt to reduce Buckley’s focus on the integrity of the American
electoral system to a single threat to its integrity, namely, quid pro quo corruption, and a narrowly
construed version of quid pro quo corruption at that.  The original Buckley had a much broader
view of potential threats to the government’s integrity in the eyes of voters.  If integrity is the end,
and elimination of corruption is a means, then curbing the influence of big contributions on the
decisionmaking of public officials is a compelling interest because their decisions should be guided
  The Citizens United majority did rely on other precedents, but they were dissents in194
decisions where the majority opinion construed quid pro quo more broadly.  There were
numerous precedents in majority opinions, in contrast, supporting the Buckley majority’s view.
  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.195
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by some vision of the public interest and deliberation.
In sum, Citizens United could not legitimately cite Buckley as the basis for its holding
because quid pro quo meant something more expansive for the Buckley Court than the meaning
adopted by Citizens United.  Had Citizens United recognized that the actual meaning of quid pro
quo for the Buckley Court included influence or access, it would have confronted two choices. 
Either it would have acknowledged the need to overturn this aspect of Buckley explicitly. 
Alternatively, it would have realized the necessity of providing an independent justification for its
claim that giving access and influence cannot constitute corruption as a matter of law, based upon
considerations other than precedent.   Absent such a justification or explicit rejection of Buckley,194
Citizens United’s claim about the meaning of quid pro quo has no foundation other than an
interpretive mistake.  Buckley 2.0 would thus reject this aspect of Citizens United, which, in turn,
would weaken the claim that independent expenditures cannot pose a threat of corruption as a
matter of law.
4.  Buckley 2.0's analysis of the appearance of corruption.
Justice Kennedy states in Citizens United that “[t]he appearance of influence or access,
furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in democracy.”   His support for his195
assertion is the further assertion that “ingratiation and access are not corruption” as a matter of
  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.  Kennedy adds that the fact that corporations make196
independent expenditures itself acknowledges “the ultimate influence” of voters.  Id.  Kennedy’s
comment does not prove what he thinks it does.  The fact that donors fund independent
expenditures to get a candidate elected or re-elected is wholly consistent with the donors’ hope
that the candidate, once elected, will be grateful and thus influenced in his agenda or official
actions by the donors’ wishes.  Candidates also want to continue to inspire their large donors’
generosity in future elections, and thus have an additional reason to please them while in office.  
  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361.197
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.  See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text (discussing198
this sentence).  
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 n.29199
(1973)).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.200
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law   and the dictum that “it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the196
governing rule.”  197
 Buckley 2.0 would observe that when the original Buckley stated that the appearance of
corruption is “of almost equal concern” to the actuality of corruption, it immediately linked the
appearance of corruption to “public awareness of opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions.”  It reasoned that “Congress could legitimately conclude198
that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence  ‘is also critical ... if confidence in the
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”  The original199
Buckley thus agreed with Citizens United that preserving citizens’ trust or faith in their
government is the underlying issue, but it disagreed with the later decision about what causes
citizens to lose trust or confidence in government.  Further, the original Buckley specifically
identified “the appearance of improper influence” (emphasis added) as a significant threat to
confidence in representative democracy justifying certain campaign finance regulations.   These200
  See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 29291 (1971) (statement of Sen. Chiles) (emphasizing the201
need for measures to restore “public confidence in [...] the elective process); Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971: Hearing on S. 1, S. 382, and S. 956 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications, S. Comm. On Commerce, 92  Cong. 542 (1971) (statement of Sen. Frank E.nd
Moss) (noting the “widespread cynicism” traceable to the “vast influence” of big contributors).
  See 558 U.S. at 360.202
  See Ben Jacobs & David Smith, 'Politics are corrupt': fears about money and its203
influence on elections loom large, THE GUARDIAN (2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/ 2016/jul/08/trump-clinton-sanders-super-pacs-election-money; William Alan Nelson II,
Buying the Electorate: An Empirical Study of the Current Campaign Finance Landscape and
How the Supreme Court Erred in Not Revisiting Citizens United, 61 CLEV. ST.  L. REV. 443, 459-
__ (2013); GALLUP, INC, TRUST IN GOVERNMENTGALLUP.COM, https://news.gallup.com/poll/
5392/trust-government.aspx (finding that as of 2010, 55% think people running the government
are crooked).  See also Rebecca L. Brown & Andrew D. Martin, Rhetoric and Reality: Testing
the Harm of Campaign Spending, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1066, 1071-72  (2015) (describing the loss
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statements are evidence that the original Buckley interpreted the appearance of corruption to
include an ordinary person’s predictable reaction to oversize contributions, i.e., that they would
influence, even if they did not completely determine, a recipient’s decisionmaking. 
In addition, the Buckley approach reflects FECA’s legislative history, in which lawmakers
expressly linked contribution limits to the problem of influence and indebtedness, not just to
bargains struck.   Although Citizens United also recognized that the touchstone of the integrity201
of government is citizens’ trust in the system,  the Court seems to assume that the appearance of202
corruption is inextricably connected  to bribery (as, in its view, corruption is)--as though public
impressions of the influence of wealth on the agendas and attitudes of lawmakers short of bribery
were of no legal consequence for the question of appearances. 
In point of fact, empirical analysis shows otherwise.  Buckley 2.0 could bolster its
interpretation of the original Buckley by citing numerous surveys showing that ordinary citizens
equate gaining influence or buying access with corruption.   It is thus consistent with both the203
of faith).  
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.204
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Supreme Court’s own precedents and empirical data to have a capacious definition of corruption in
“the appearance of corruption,” even were corruption per se construed narrowly.  In short, the
question of appearances cannot be decided as a matter of law.  Thus, even if Buckley 2.0 did not
contest Citizens United’s definition of “corruption,” it would likely reject that Court’s narrow
definition of the appearance of corruption when evaluating Congress’s attempt to enact reforms
addressing threats to citizens’ trust in government owing to the appearance of corruption.
Buckley 2.0's likely conclusion concerning the appearance of corruption can be traced to
the specific concern articulated by Buckley and subsequent decisions, namely, that people’s
“confidence in the system of representative government,” i.e., the “integrity of our system,” will be
undermined by seeing large contributors obtaining special access to or favors from public
officials.   Although some commentators have argued that large contributions are more often204
motivated by candidates’ policies than the reverse, the vast majority of ordinary voters see large
donations as corrupting influences because they give large contributors a disproportionate voice
over legislation and public policies.  Representative government, in contrast to other forms of
democracy, presupposes the responsiveness of lawmakers to citizens in general, and not just to
elites or interest groups.  Although no individual or group can expect that its views will necessarily
carry the day and be translated into government action, it is reasonable for them to believe that
their views will be taken seriously and receive meaningful consideration and that the wishes of the
majority of citizens will not be routinely disregarded in favor of the agendas of large contributors. 
If ex ante the views of donors of huge sums of money will determine legislative outcomes and
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.  Parallel rules apply to unions.  See supra note205
27.
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  See 52 U.S.C. §30116(a)(7)(B), formerly 2 U.S.C.206
§441a(a)(7)(B); 11 C.F.R. §109.21(b).  For the limited effectiveness of this rule, see infra notes
214-223 and accompanying text.
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.207
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executive actions, the resulting system does not deserve the label “representative.” In short,
Buckley 2.0 would rest its interpretation on the perceptions of ordinary citizens because the
original Buckley and the concept of representative democracy both require this.
5.  Buckley 2.0's analysis of the independence of contemporary independent expenditures. 
Citizens United invalidated existing restrictions on corporate spending using general
corporate revenues as long as corporations are engaged in independent spending.   If their205
spending is coordinated with a candidate or a candidate’s campaign, however, the amounts
involved will be re-characterized as contributions and, thus, be subject to contribution limits.206
The original Buckley, which protected independent expenditures from limits enacted by
Congress in 1971, involved independent spending by individuals or groups.  As stated by the
original Buckley, the reason Congress cannot constitutionally limit the amounts spent on
independent expenditures is that such spending does not pose a threat of corruption because such
spending is not controlled by a candidate and, thus, might be viewed by the candidate as unhelpful
or even harmful.   As a consequence, the candidate would not feel indebted to or under an207
obligation to please the persons responsible for such independent spending.
In taking this position, the Buckley Court was not wholly naive; it conditioned its remarks
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.208
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.209
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.210
  See 11 C.F.R. §109.20 (defining “coordinated” as “cooperation, consultation or211
concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee,
or a political party committee”). 
  See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55-56 & n.25 (2004) (Shays I). 212
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on the independent spending being “totally” independent.   Otherwise the inference from the208
candidate’s lack of control and potential for harm would not be warranted.  Further, it noted that
independent spending did “not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption
comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions,”  thereby suggesting that the209
Court did not rule out, as a matter of law or otherwise, the possibility that independent spending
could at some time pose such a threat.  For Buckley, independent spending was to be protected
because of “its substantially diminished potential for abuse.”   The task for Buckley 2.0, therefore,210
is to examine whether the threat posed by independent spending as practiced in the current
environment is as diminished as it was in 1976.  Depending upon the result, Buckley 2.0's inquiry
could affect independent spending by individuals as well as by corporations and other business
interests, with ramifications for the constitutional status of unlimited contributions to independent
expenditure groups as well.
FECA does not define “independent” or its opposite, “coordinated”; rather the terms are
defined in FEC regulations.   Initially, the FEC’s implementing regulations defined coordination211
in terms of a candidate engaging in "substantial discussion or negotiation" with a third party that
resulted in "collaboration or agreement."   In 2001, Congress rejected that interpretation as too212
  See BCRA, supra note 18, §214(c); 52 U.S.C. §30116(7)(B)(ii) note.213
  The history of this litigation is described in Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 918-919214
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
  See, e.g., Democracy 21 and Campaign Legal Center, Comments on REG 2015-04 re215
Independent Spending by Corporations, Labor Organizations, Foreign Nationals and others 2
(Oct. 27, 2015).  See Public Citizen, Comments on Supplemental Notice 2010-01: Coordinated
Communications 4 (Feb. 24, 2010) (stating that there are “crippling weaknesses inherent in the
2007 coordination rule”); Brent Ferguson, Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign
Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 471 (2015). See also Bradley
Smith, SuperPACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 603, 605-606 (2013) (quoting but disagreeing with lawmakers, academics, and party
officials who deny the independence of independent entities like Super PACs).
  11 C.F.R. §109.21(d)(2), (3).  If the information in question was obtained from a216
publicly available source, however, coordination has not occurred.  11 C.F.R. §109.21(d)(3).  
  According to the FEC, “‘material’ has its ordinary legal meaning, which is217
‘important; more or less necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits.’ . . . The term
‘material’ is included to safeguard against the inclusion of incidental participation that is not
important to, or does not influence, decisions regarding a communication.” 68 FED. REG. 434
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 976 (6th ed. 1990)).”
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weak, and it directed the FEC to promulgate regulations covering a much wider range of
interactions between candidates and third parties supporting their campaigns with allegedly
independent spending.  The resulting new coordination regulations were successfully challenged213
in court three times for being too permissive to satisfy the Congressional mandate.   214
That the current regulations are too permissive has been noted by reformers and members
of both political parties because they do not classify as “coordinated” communications that would
be considered coordinated “under any common sense definition.”   Some aspects of the definition215
are vague.  For example, a communication by a third party may only be considered coordinated if a
candidate or staff member is “materially involved in decisions regarding the communications,”216
with uncertain application of standards to determine materiality.   In addition, the rules217
  See 11 C.F.R. §109.21(d)(4), (5). 218
  See FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-09, 4 and n. 8 (July 22, 2010) (finding that the219
President’s “overlap of duties” would not “compromise the Super PAC’s independence because
of the representations made by the organization),
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2010-09/AO-2010-09.pdf.
  See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinion 2016-21 (Jan. 12, 2017) (discussing several220
situations in which a candidate’s or party’s former employee joins a hybrid PAC and concluding
that the use of information acquired in previous position will be coordinated if it is material).  See
also supra note 219.
  See Paul S. Ryan, Votes and Voices in 2012 Symposium: Two Faulty Assumptions of 221
Citizens United and How to Limit the Damage, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 583, 586 (2013).  Although
the quoted statement may be an exaggeration, because the standard would be the materiality of
the information transmitted, not specificity, nonetheless the less specific the information in
question, the harder it would be to prove its materiality.
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themselves are often lax: they permit independent expenditure entities to hire the same vendors,
such as pollsters and advertising companies, as the candidate uses as long as a “firewall” is created
between those in the company representing the candidate and those representing the independent
expenditure entity.   In fact, a firewall is not necessarily mandatory: the FEC approved an exempt218
organization with both a traditional PAC and an independent expenditure Super PAC, even though
the same individual was President of the exempt organization and Treasurer of both PACs, based
upon the organization’s simple representation to the FEC that the Super PAC would not engage in
any coordinated activities.   Moreover, not infrequently, a member of a lawmaker’s staff resigns219
from his or her staff position before an election and then establishes and operates an independent
expenditure entity, even a single-candidate Super PAC, to help elect or re-elect the lawmaker,220
bringing along a reservoir of inside information.  One commentator has opined that a candidate’s
spouse can buy advertising urging the election of the candidate without violating the coordination
rules as long as they do not “discuss[] the details of specific ad buys.”   Further, communications221
  See Alex Roarty and Shane Goldmacher, They’re Not Allowed to Talk. But Candidates222
and PACs Are Brazenly Communicating All the Time, THE ATLANTIC (October 30, 2014);
Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Drops Illegal Coordination Charges Against McGinty Campaign,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 20, 2016). 
  See Rachael Marcus and John Dunbar, Rules against Coordination between Super223
PACs, Candidates, Tough to Enforce, CTR FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Jan. 13, 2012, updated May
19, 2014, https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/
rules-against-coordination-between-super-pacs-candidates-tough-to-enforce.
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made in public are exempted from the definition of coordination, so candidates or their surrogates
can, for example, state openly when interviewed on radio or television a campaign’s “wish list” for
additional advertising or get-out-the-vote efforts in specific locations.   Even a wink and a nod222
would be unnecessary for independent spending and campaigns to be coordinated in such instances
without falling under the legal definition of coordination.  For these and other reasons, the
coordination rules have been repeatedly criticized for failing to ensure genuine independence, and
the FEC has rarely found an ostensibly independent activity to be coordinated.223
In light of these provisions and practices, Buckley 2.0 might well conclude that what
satisfies the legal definition of independence is not in fact “totally” independent, as Buckley
understood that concept in 1976.  Such a finding would force Buckley 2.0 to assess whether the
absence of meaningful independence today is a sufficient reason for revising the blanket protection
it gave independent expenditures by individuals in 1976 or for reversing Citizens United’s decision
to allow corporations to fund independent spending with general treasury revenues and
SpeechNow.org’s extension of that ruling to contributions to independent spending groups.
III.  HAS THE TIME COME TO OVERRULE CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW.ORG?
Buckley 2.0 will thus be forced to consider whether the time has come to overrule Citizens
United, which would have the concomitant effect of invalidating SpeechNow.org insofar as it relies
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15.224
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.  See also supra note 3.  225
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.226
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-46, 64.227
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-27.  See also id. at 67.228
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on the reasoning of Citizens United about the relationship between independent expenditures and
corruption.
A.  Citizens United and Buckley 2.0's Review of Corporations’ Right to Political Speech
In contemplating such a consequential action, Buckley 2.0 would first step back to review
the principles grounding the original Buckley decision.  These are:
1.  That the First Amendment affords a very high degree of protection to both political expression
and political association.224
2.  That neither of these protected rights is absolute.  As stated in the original Buckley, “[e]ven a
‘significant interference’ with protected rights of political association” may at times be justified.225
3.  That government restrictions on these rights must be subject to exacting scrutiny, more so in
the case of political expenditures and somewhat less so in the case of political contributions.226
4.  That exacting scrutiny requires the Court to assess the importance of the government’s interest
in regulating campaign speech and the relationship between the government’s interest and the
means chosen to effectuate that interest.227
5.  That the interest of the government in regulating campaign contributions is primarily to prevent
corruption of candidates and office holders owing to the influence of large contributions and also
to prevent the appearance of corruption in the eyes of the citizens and voters.228
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.229
   See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, where the Court refers to corruption and its appearance230
as FECA’s primary purpose, not its exclusive purpose. 
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 49 n.55, 66-67.  See also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785231
n.21.
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6.  That this interest can in principle justify imposing some burdens on political speech because the
presence of corruption or its appearance threatens the integrity of representative government.   In229
a representative democracy, members of Congress and the President and Vice-President are
elected by citizens at large with the understanding that they will act in the interest of the citizens
and the public interest.  While the content of the public interest is often contested, it is never
legitimate for representatives to make decisions in their official capacity based, in whole or in part,
on the consequences for their own electability, including the necessity to raise sufficient amounts of
money to be competitive in an election.  Thus, the government has an important interest in
regulating campaign funding to preserve the integrity of representative government by reducing the
threat of corruption or its appearance.
7.  That, although preventing corruption and its appearance are the primary justifications for
FECA’s restrictions on campaign contributions, nothing in the original Buckley precludes Congress
taking additional steps to protect the integrity of the system of representative government if they
satisfy exacting scrutiny and promote the integrity of representative government.   For example,230
electoral integrity also depends upon an informed electorate.   Both the protection of political231
speech and disclosure rules are justified for the sake of facilitating an informed electorate.
8.  That because confidence in elected officials’ integrity when acting in their official capacity is
essential to the integrity of the system of representative government itself, the original Buckley
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.  See also id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and232
dissenting in part).
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 22.233
  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49, 56.234
  558 U.S. at 346.235
  For example, when Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent expenditures, it236
did not make an exception for corporations and unions, so Buckley must have assumed they
would be engaging in independent expenditures along with individuals and associations, which it
did mention.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.
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emphasized that preventing the appearance of corruption is almost as critical as preventing the
actuality of corruption itself.  232
9.  That not interfering with the ability of candidates to have sufficient resources for effective
advocacy is another condition of the integrity of representative government and, thus, the means
government selects to address corruption, its appearance, an informed electorate, confidence in
elected officials, or other threats to the integrity of representative government should not obstruct
the possibility of effective advocacy by candidates for election or re-election.  233
10.  That it is inconsistent with the First Amendment to restrict the speech of some to assure that
citizens at large have equal resources to make their voices heard.234
Buckley 2.0 would then examine the reasoning presented in Citizens United to justify its
conclusion that it is unconstitutional to prevent corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds for advocating the election or defeat of candidates in those cases if the entities do
not coordinate with candidates or their campaigns.  First, Citizens United asserted that those
restrictions on corporations and unions “could not have been squared with the reasoning of
Buckley,”  based largely on inferences Citizens United drew from what Buckley failed to say.235 236
  See Citizens United, 558 US at 346.237
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340, citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.238
  The Court thus seems to have viewed this as a case of content discrimination, because239
the government sought to silence the view of business entities who opposed the state’s proposed
tax reform.  But see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (asserting that Bellotti was not about
viewpoint discrimination).  
  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-785.240
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Citizens United buttressed its assertion that Buckley stood for the “principle” that “the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity,”  by237
turning to First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which invalidated a state ban on corporations
spending to air messages on a controversial public issue.   Bellotti involved a Massachusetts238
statute banning independent contributions or expenditures by corporations and other business
entities during a ballot initiative relating to the state’s proposal for a graduated income tax. The
Bellotti Court emphasized that the challenged statute threatened to prevent the airing of a point of
view that might otherwise not be represented during the debate over the proposed legislation, in
particular, a view opposed to the state’s position on the ballot initiative.   In expressing its239
concern about the government using its legislative power to suppress opposition to its position, the
Bellotti Court said that the First Amendment does not permit the government to prevent a class of
speakers from contributing to the discussion of public issues.   240
 This is the statement that Citizens United cited for the proposition that the First
Amendment categorically bars the government from preventing a class of speakers from engaging
in political speech.  However, Buckley 2.0 would observe that neither the Bellotti holding nor its
reasoning claimed to invalidate regulation of corporate political spending in general.  Rather, the
  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.241
  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.242
  Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).243
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-242.244
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241-242, 246.245
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Bellotti Court explicitly distinguished the government’s interest in restricting corporate speech
during a ballot initiative from other situations, noting that its “consideration of a corporation’s
right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different
context of participation in a political campaign for election to public office.”   It reiterated that241
the “risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidates “simply is not present” in a
discussion of ideas to be decided by a referendum.   Because of Bellotti’s express distinction242
between discussion of issues relating to a referendum, on the one hand, and promoting candidates
for election, on the other, Buckley 2.0 would not find that Bellotti stands for a constitutional bar to
singling out corporations with respect to spending in the elections of candidates or a presumptive
right of corporate political spending outside the referendum context.
Buckley 2.0 would find Citizens United’s reliance upon FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life (MCFL)  similarly misplaced.  MCFL was an educational and advocacy nonprofit243
corporation devoted to promoting human life that, by virtue of being a corporation, was prohibited
by the federal prohibition from spending its treasury funds on political advocacy.   The MCFL244
Court went to great lengths to distinguish MCFL from commercial corporations.  It noted that
MCFL was a small nonstock corporation that itself engaged in no commercial activities and,
further, accepted no money from business entities or unions.   Indeed, it raised money from245
  479 U.S. at 242.246
  479 U.S. at 253-255.  Even so, the Court concluded that the burdens were not247
“insurmountable,” and thus rested its holding on the lack of compelling government interest.  Id.
at 263.
  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337-339.248
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257-260.249
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258.250
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263.251
  See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263.  See also id. at 263-264 (outlining three features of the252
MCFL facts that support the Court’s holding, none of which is true of commercial corporations).
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contributions from individuals and from garage sales, bake sales, dances, raffles, and picnics.  246
The Court emphasized how burdensome requiring a small and unsophisticated nonprofit to
establish a PAC would be, given the FEC regulations applying to PACs.   Despite MCFL’s247
restriction of its holding to a certain fact pattern, Citizens United cited the administrative burdens
catalogued in MCFL as evidence that requiring corporations and unions of any size to fund express
advocacy with PAC money would be unconstitutionally burdensome and would amount to an
absolute prohibition against those entities engaging in this form of political speech.   By contrast,248
MCFL agreed with concerns raised about the influence of corporate wealth on campaigns.  It249
explicitly distinguished that situation from “this fund,”  concluding that the difference between250
MCFL and commercial corporations was one of kind and not merely degree.   For these reasons,251
and because MCFL expressly asserted that the situation of commercial corporations was a
“question not before us,”  Buckley 2.0 would find the analogy between MCFL-type corporations252
and commercial ones untenable.  It would thus conclude that MCFL cannot be used as precedent
for treating the speech rights of all corporations of whatever size and purpose as indistinguishable
  See the summary of “a century of congressional efforts to curb corporations’253
potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections,’” in Federal Election Comm’n v.
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-156 (2003).
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from a First Amendment perspective.
In short, Buckley 2.0 would argue that neither Bellotti nor MCFL can be cited as support
for Citizens United’s absolutist position regarding corporate political spending.  In addition, in
reaching its holding, Citizens United ignored the weight of numerous Court precedents expressing
concerns about corporate funding of campaign speech.   Buckley 2.0 would thus find that253
Citizens United leaped without justification from language about a ballot initiative and a small
advocacy organization funded by individual donations to an assertion of general political speech
rights for corporations of whatever size and nature intervening in campaigns for public office.
In addition, Buckley 2.0 would also question the inference drawn by Citizens United from
its assertion of general political speech rights for corporations. Citizens United first argued that,
because corporations in general have the same right to political expression as other speakers, it
would be unconstitutional to restrict their use of their own resources (including treasury funds)
unless the government could show that such restrictions are necessary to avoid corruption or its
appearance.  The Court then asserted that such a showing is impossible if corporations are not
coordinating with candidates, relying upon the original Buckley’s statement that uncoordinated
spending at that time did not pose a risk of corruption or its appearance.  The original Buckley’s
statement referred to independent spending by individuals (singly) or non-corporate groups or
associations.  However, Citizens United concluded that the same reasoning would apply equally to
corporations acting independently of candidates and, thus, that the existing ban on corporations
using treasury funds was a violation of the First Amendment’s protection of a presumptive political
  See Part II.B.3.254
  See Part II.B.4.255
  See Part II.B.4.256
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speech rights of corporations. 
As was argued in Part II, Buckley 2.0 will have several reasons to reject this aspect of the
reasoning of  Citizens United.  First, as noted above,  Citizens United’s conclusion depended254
upon a narrow interpretation of quid pro quo as bribery or a concrete exchange between the
person making the expenditure and a candidate, which would be impossible if the parties acted
independently of one another.  Buckley 2.0, in contrast, pointed out that the original Buckley’s
understanding of quid pro quo included such things as influencing a candidate or obtaining access,
and not just bribery.  Citizen United’s misreading of this aspect of the original Buckley was
significant because independent spending is not by definition inconsistent with the independent
spender having influence on candidates, who are aware of the identity of those who make outsize
expenditures, even in those instances when their identities are hidden from the public.
Second, Buckley 2.0 concluded that the appearance of corruption could arise when big
contributors influence or gain access to candidates and elected officials, since these signal
corruption to ordinary citizens, as they did to those who enacted FECA.   Buckley 2.0 reinforced255
the original Buckley’s observation with contemporary survey data linking people’s perception of
the influence of money on officials with their distrust of government.   Its conclusion was256
reinforced by the proliferation of dark money groups to which business interests can contribute
unlimited sums without public knowledge despite the likelihood of candidates knowing and being
  See Part I.C (noting that the amount of money involved cannot be quantified because257
of the absence of disclosure).
  See Part II.B.5.258
  See supra note 95 and accompanying text.259
  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.260
  See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.261
  See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 262
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influenced by such spending.   257
Third, as noted above,  the original Buckley claimed that independent spending poses no258
threat of corruption or its appearance only if the spending is totally independent.  After reviewing
current campaign finance regulations and practices, Buckley 2.0 concluded that conformity with
the legal test for independence does not guaranty total independence so as to preclude concrete
exchanges between contributors and representatives, influence, or access.  Especially telling for
Buckley 2.0 was the emergence and rapid increase in single-candidate Super PACS staffed by
associates of a candidate and permitted to raise money with the active assistance of the
candidate.   Moreover, Buckley 2.0 would note that the original Buckley assumed there would be259
disclosure to counter the risk of corruption,  but that increasingly campaign spending employs260
non-disclosing vehicles, uses non-revealing names, or engages in other strategies to prevent voters
from knowing who is responsible for campaign messages.   Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that261
in contrast to the situation in 1976, independent spending does in fact “presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions.”262
supra Part I.D.263
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Finally, Buckley 2.0 would have to consider whether, given contemporary campaign
conditions, business interests would be able to engage in effective advocacy if they were prevented
from using their treasury funds in pursuit of their electoral objectives.  The empirical data detailed
in Part I.A.1 demonstrated that business interests increased their campaign spending (contributions
and other expenditures) eight and a half times (in constant dollars) between the 1975-1976 and the
2015-2016 presidential election cycles, without taking into account spending made possible by
Citizens United, even though the cost of the elections in those years increased only four and a half
times in constant dollars.  In addition, invalidating Citizens United’s holding would leave
corporations and related interests free to engage in unlimited issue advocacy targeting election
outcomes using their treasury funds.   Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that business interests263
would continue to be able to engage in effective advocacy despite its overruling Citizens United
because of the many avenues remaining for them to participate in the discussion of candidates
during elections.  Thus, in light of the greatly increased risk of corruption linked to unlimited
spending by entities not truly independent of candidates, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that Citizens
United was wrongly decided and that returning to the status quo would be consistent with exacting
scrutiny of the First Amendment political speech claims at issue. 
B.  SpeechNow.org and Buckley 2.0's Analysis of Unlimited Contributions to Independent 
Spending Groups
If Buckley 2.0 rejects Citizens United’s claims about the speech rights of corporations, the
nature of quid pro quo arrangements, and the implications of FECA’s independence standard as a
matter of law, the holding of SpeechNow.org would not survive because of its dependence on
  See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.264
  See supra notes 113-115.265
  See supra note 94 and accompanying text.266
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these doctrines.  Even if Buckley 2.0 does not invalidate the central teaching of Citizens United,
however, it would likely find the appellate court’s extension of the earlier decision illegitimate. 
Buckley 2.0 would evaluate the constitutionality of limiting contributions to independent
expenditure entities in light of the original Buckley’s analysis of independent expenditures and the
developments in campaign finance law and practices since then.  It would begin by reviewing
empirical evidence regarding the nature and extent of spending by these entities and the role of
unlimited contributions in funding them.  
1.  In the 2015-2016 election cycle, more than a fifth of the total (reported) election
spending of $6.5 billion was traceable to independent expenditure outside spending groups, with
Super PACs responsible for more than $1 billion of this amount.   Unreported spending by264
outside groups, including issue advocacy calculated to influence the election of specific candidates
but not subject to reporting, cannot be estimated,  but clearly added hundreds of millions of265
dollars to these totals.
2.  The amount of identifiable outside spending in the 2015-2016 election cycle represented
an increase of almost 50 percent over the comparable amount in the previous presidential election
cycle.266
3.  The massive nature of such spending was not an aberration.  In fact, because Donald
Trump received an unusual amount of free publicity, experts believe that total spending in 2015-
  See Sultan, supra note 13.267
  See supra note 91 and accompanying text.268
  See supra note 74 and accompanying text.269
  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.270
  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.271
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2016 was significantly less than it would otherwise have been.   Further, outside spending for the267
2018 mid-term elections was 60 percent greater than such spending for the 2014 mid-terms,268
confirming that the trend is for rapid increases in outside spending.  
4.  Unlimited contributions accounted for almost 90 percent of receipts of Super PACs.269
5.  Unlimited contributions also resulted in an unprecedented concentration of campaign
spending by wealthy individuals, accounting for almost all of the funds raised by independent
spending entities: almost 90 percent of contributions to Super PACs (more than $900 million) was
attributable to 511 individuals, or 1 percent of donors.   270
6.  It was estimated that, combining unlimited contributions to Super PACs and other
independent spending groups, only one percent of the top one percent (.01 percent) of adults were
responsible for $2.3 billion in outside money raised during the 2015-2016 election cycle.271
Buckley 2.0 would first examine the consequences of recognizing that unlimited
contributions are not themselves direct expenditures and, thus, are not entitled to the same level of
constitutional protection as independent expenditures.  When the original Buckley upheld a $1,000
cap on contributions by individuals to candidates, it argued that contributions are not entitled to
the same degree of First Amendment protection as expenditures because the burden of a
contribution cap is only a “marginal restriction” on the donor, since contributions are symbolic
  See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.272
  See supra note 127 and accompanying text.273
  See supra Part II.B.5.274
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speech and the cap leaves individuals free to participate in elections in other ways, including
making independent expenditures without dollar restrictions.   Eliminating SpeechNow.org’s272
validation of unlimited contributions would similarly leave individuals the ability to contribute up to
$5,000 to individual PACs, make unlimited independent expenditures, engage in unlimited issue
advocacy relevant to an election, and participate in the other ways listed by Buckley.   Buckley273
2.0 would thus conclude that subjecting contributions made to independent spending entities to
dollar limits would not excessively burden individuals’ speech rights in elections.
However, the original Buckley considered more than the extent of the burden from
contribution limits.  It upheld those limits because it found that the government interest in imposing
dollar limits to reduce the threat of corruption was substantial.  The unlimited contributions that
SpeechNow.org validated are made to recipients other than candidates and their campaigns, so
Buckley 2.0 would have to examine the threat of corruption in this different context.  It would
explore whether unlimited contributions to independent spending groups are less prone to be
corrupting than contributions to candidates because the groups are independent.
Buckley 2.0's conclusion would rest on a combination of factors.  First, it would note again
that the “totally” independent standard of Buckley is not satisfied in several kinds of outside
spending groups because of the problematic character of the legal standard for independence.  274
Further, even if the groups are totally independent, those who contribute to them are not barred
from acting in concert with candidates.  Buckley 2.0 would note, for example, that the FEC
  See, e.g., FEC Advisory Op. 2011-12 (June 30, 2011).275
  See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.276
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permits candidates themselves to solicit contributions at fundraising events hosted by legally
independent spending groups as long as the candidates request contributions of no more than
$5,000, even though the groups themselves can solicit sums of any size at the same event while the
candidate is there as a guest or featured speaker.   Based upon these considerations, Buckley 2.0275
would conclude that the risk of corruption from large contributions is at least as great as, and
probably greater than, the risk of corruption from contributions to candidates because of the close
association of candidates to Super PACs and the unlimited size of the contributions.
In addition to reviewing the legal standards governing proximity between candidates and
independent spending groups, Buckley 2.0 would also review the statistics for unlimited outside
fundraising since Citizens United.  It would observe that the sums raised have been enormous and
that the ability of high wealth donors to aggregate their contributions together in Super PACs and
other groups has amplified their impact on elections far beyond what extremely large but
uncoordinated independent expenditures by individuals could generate.   Taking into276
consideration the prevalence of single-candidate independent expenditure groups, the rate at which
such spending is growing, and the close ties between candidates and legally independent groups,
Buckley 2.0 would conclude that regardless of whether the groups and candidates coordinate
specific strategies and ad buys, the groups have become conduits enabling individuals to evade the
caps on contributions to candidates.  Moreover, because the sums raised are so great, the threat of
corruption is correspondingly acute.  The threat is further magnified by the ability of independent
  See supra note 96 and accompanying text.277
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spending groups funded by unlimited contributions to outspend candidates in targeted races.   In277
evaluating the significance of these statistics, Buckley 2.0 would observe that post-SpeechNow.org, 
outside groups are now in a position to dictate the core of a candidate’s governing agenda by
threatening to withhold support in general elections or back competitors in primaries.  In short,
Buckley 2.0 would conclude that facts on the ground and misinterpretations of law demonstrate
that the SpeechNow.org court erred when it held that contributions to independent spending
groups were incapable of coordination and corruption as a matter of law.
C.  Conclusion
Since Buckley was decided in 1976, the campaign finance framework that it erected has
been eroded by a series of decisions claiming to rest upon its foundations.  During the same period,
campaign financing has been transformed by the skyrocketing cost of campaigns, innovative
campaign practices, rapid increases in the amount of money injected into elections by business
interests, an increasingly small number of high wealth individuals accounting for an increasingly
large percentage of campaign spending, and a trend toward employing dark money campaign
vehicles and adopting other strategies to evade campaign finance disclosure rules.  
Some of these changes were introduced or accelerated by the decisions in Citizens United 
and its progeny, SpeechNow.org.  In important respects, each of these decisions made two
important errors: they misrepresented the extent of their support in precedent and they disregarded
empirical campaign realities in applying doctrines.  The thought experiment Buckley 2.0 has
attempted to identify and shine a spotlight on these errors.  The result is a more faithful reading of
the original Buckley and a more honest recognition of campaign financing realities that threaten the
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integrity of representative government in America. 
